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A PRISONER'S

RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS DIET BEYOND
THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

Benjamin Pi-wei Liu
Are religious prisonersentitled to dietary accommodations consistent with their
religious beliefs? The current answer for this question derives from two 1987
cases, Turner v. Safley and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, in which the U.S.
Supreme Court articulateda factor-driven balancing test. Under this test, a prison
regulation may burden an inmate's rights only if, on balance, the regulation
reasonably serves a penological interest. However, the applicationof the Turner
test often leads to conflicting results in the lower courts.
The conflicting legal decisions stem from ambiguities in the concept of "reasonableness." In this Comment, I argue that the solution lies in portions of the Bill
of Rights beyond the Free Exercise Clause. The Equal Protection Clause, the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, and the Establishment Clause can inform
the Turner analysis under the Free Exercise Clause or even serve as separate bases
for a religious dietary accommodation claim. This multirights approach requires
judges to heed the Constitution as a whole when conducting an analysis of one of
its provisions, and ultimately moves the "standard of review" analysis beyond
debates regardingthe levels of scrutiny.
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When prisoners emerge from the shadows to press a constitutional
claim, they invoke no alien set of principles drawn from a distant culture. Rather, they speak the language of the charter upon which all
of us rely to hold official power accountable. They ask us to acknowledge
that power exercised in the shadows must be restrained at least as
diligently as power that acts in the sunlight.
-Justice William Brennan, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz

1.

482 U.S. 342, 355 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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INTRODUCTION
Many religions regulate their followers' daily meals, through which the
faithful assert their relationship to the spiritual realm Religious commandments may also require or prohibit consumption of specific food on festive
or ritualistic occasions.' So fundamental are these dietary restrictions that
the availability of religious diet can foster religious communities.4 What if
adherents lost the ability to control their menus? Such is the problem religious inmates face in the American penal system.5
American prisons appear to accommodate religious inmates' diets.
Federal prisons offer "the religious diet menu" to accommodate inmates
with religious dietary restrictions to the extent permitted by budgetary,
security, and administrative constraints.6 By one author's account, the food
2. Jews and Muslims affirm their covenant with God by practicing kosher and halal diets,
respectively. Most practitioners avoid the meat of animals with split hooves (pork), but believers
of the Orthodox branches of both religions further exclude any food that is prepared without
adhering to a particular set of procedures. Buddhism also contains several traditions of dietary restriction. The first precept of Buddhism (there are five) is a vow to refrain from killing creatures.
Buddhists are also instructed to achieve four sublime states of mind when dealing with fellow
creatures: love, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity. While the Mahayana Buddhists in
China practice the first precept and the state of compassion through a strict vegetarian diet, other
Buddhists only avoid meats that are slaughtered for their specific consumption. BUDDHISM AND
Every Friday, devout
VEGETARIANISM, at http://www.urbandharma.org/udharma3/vegi.html.
Roman Catholics limit their animal protein to fish. The Hindus shun beef, the meat of the sacred
animal, and some sects espouse strict vegetarianism. For a history of the Hindu attitude towards
cows and beef that touched off a recent political storm in India, see DWIJENDRA N. JHA, THE
MYTH OF THE HOLY COW (2003) (surveying early Hindus' carnivorous attitude and later
diet, according to Biblical passages
prohibition against eating beef). Rastafarians practice the Ital
mandating a diet of "herb." See Genesis 3:18 ("[T]hou shall eat the herb of the field."); Exodus
10:12 ("[Eat every herb of the land."); Proverbs 15:17 ("Better is a dinner of herb where love is,
than a stalled ox and hatred therewith."). See generally RASTA NICK, THE RASTAFARIAN
RELIGION, at http://www.rasta-man.co.uk/religion.htm.
3. Basic foodstuffs may form part of a religious ritual. An example is the use of bread and
wine during a Catholic mass. Food may be an essential part of religious festivals, such as the eating of matzo during Passover for Jews, or dates at the end of the Muslim Ramadan fast. A religion
may require fasting or mandate special meals during certain hours or days. For example, during
the forty-day period prior to Easter (Lent), many Catholics maintain a diet without meat.
See, e.g., BARRY M. LEVENSON, HABEAS CODFISH: REFLECTIONS ON FOOD AND THE
4.
LAW 191 (2001) (noting that New York's former kosher food fraud laws enacted in the 1920s ensured
a supply of kosher food, which was important to Jewish immigrants recently arrived from Eastern
Europe).
5. For example, the usual source of protein for inmates is slaughtered animals. Unfortunately,
Hindu inmates cannot eat beef, Jewish and Muslim inmates cannot eat pork, and Rastafarians
cannot eat meat at all. These inmates would have to forgo part or all of their meals in order to
continue their religious exercise.
6.
See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 548.20(a) ("The Bureau [of Prisons] provides inmates requesting a
religious diet reasonable and equitable opportunity to observe their religious dietary practice
within the constraints of budget limitations and the security and orderly running of the institution

HeinOnline -- 51 UCLA L. Rev. 1153 2003-2004

1154

51 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1151 (2004)

program in federal prisons began with one main menu for all inmates and a
separate kosher diet for Jewish prisoners, until a more comprehensive
arrangement became necessary to accommodate increasing requests from
inmates of other religions.7 Thus, the religious diet was introduced, in
which all meats served were both Jewish kosher and acceptable to Muslims,
and served with utensils and plates reserved for the religious diet. Meat was
offered three times a week, and a salad bar provided an alternative to those
who wished to avoid the meat entrees.8
However, the religious diet described above is the best-case scenario.
Behind this rosy picture lies a great deal of variation across the federal and
state prison systems. When must prisons provide special meals to accommodate religious inmates? Judicial opinions in this area represent a forty-year
tug-of-war between religious inmates' and correctional facilities' competing
interests.10 The current answer is based on a pair of 1987 cases, Turnerv. Safley"
and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,'2 in which the U.S. Supreme Court articulated
a factor-driven balancing test that weighs a prisoner's constitutional right to
the free exercise of religion against a prison administration's equally valid
penological interest in running an orderly prison. Under this test, a prison
regulation may burden an inmate's rights only if, on balance, the regulation
reasonably serves a penological interest.
Today, Turner and O'Lone have become the standard for judging whether
prison officials have violated an inmate's religious dietary rights. Curiously,
courts often reach contradictory decisions under similar fact patterns, even
though they purport to apply the same Turner test. The picture is further complicated by the Supreme Court's 1990 free exercise decision in Employment
and the Bureau through a common fare menu."). The name for religious diet programs prior to
December 9, 2002 was the "common fare" program. Regulatory Agenda, 67 Fed. Reg. 74657, 74673
(Dec. 9, 2002) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 541).
7.

JAMES A. BECKFORD & SOPHIE GILLIAT, RELIGION IN PRISON: EQUAL RITES IN A

MULTI-FAITH SOCIETY 188 (1998).
8. Id. at 188-89.
9. See Developments in the Law--The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1906-07
(2002) [hereinafter The Law of Prisons] ("On the farthest end of the spectrum... as one administrator put it, inmates 'can choose to take the pork off their plate."').
10.
Religious dietary accommodation cases emerged during the 1960s, when Black Muslim
inmates demanded accommodation of their religious practices. See, e.g., Abernathy v. Cunningham,
393 F.2d 775, 778 (4th Cir. 1968) (denying a special pork-free diet to a prisoner when the prisoner
could obtain a balanced meal by voluntarily avoiding pork or food cooked in grease or lard);
Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cit. 1969) (finding that the district court improperly
dismissed Muslim inmates' complaint against prison administrators' denial of their requests to be
fed at least a full-course pork-free diet once a day).
11.
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
12.
482 U.S. 342 (1987).
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Division v. Smith 3 and the tortured history of religious legislation such as the
1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the 2000 Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)."
This Comment argues that the conflicting legal decisions stem from
ambiguities in the concept of "reasonableness." However, I do not propose a
wholesale shift away from the reasonableness test in favor of a stricter test.
Instead, I suggest that the Turner test needs more substance, which can be found
in portions of the Bill of Rights beyond the Free Exercise Clause. The simultaneous consideration of multiple constitutional principles could better guide
judicial decisions in prison religious diet cases and ultimately would foster a
more "constitutional" jurisprudence.
Part I of this Comment describes the Turner/O'Lone test and surveys
the legal disarray among the prison religious diet cases. Part II urges judges to
analyze the facts using other constitutional frameworks in addition to the free
exercise Turner/O'Lone test. For example, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause would require courts to incorporate the hidden cost of physical deprivation and subsequent medical treatment into the free exercise Turner/O'Lone
analysis when devout inmates forgo offending meals. I" The Equal Protection
Clause would provide courts with a method of evaluating evidence of disparate
treatment in cases in which prisons provide a religious diet that satisfies
religion A but not religion B.6 The Establishment Clause also disfavors disparate accommodation. In addition, it prohibits courts and administrators from
making theology-based distinctions.7
Part III argues that the jurisdictional boundary of the prison wall is a
necessary fiction, while answering two sets of crosscutting objections to the
multirights approach. The first argues that the Turner/O'Lone test was created
to conserve judicial resources and pay deference to prison administrations,
and that the multirights approach is not consistent with these objectives.
The second argues that the Turner/O'Lonetest is no longer relevant in light
of subsequent changes in free exercise jurisprudence and prison legislation. Both
objections assume that constitutional prison jurisprudence and the penological
interest of the prison administration can and should be confined to prisons.
13.

494 U.S. 872 (1990) (changing the general standard of assessing free exercise violations

from strict scrutiny to rational basis). The Smith decision arguably undermines the rationale of the
Turner test. See infra Part III.

14.

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000) (held

unconstitutional as against the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)); Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, § 2000cc-1 (2000).
15.
See infra Part II.A.

16.

See infra Part II.B.

17.

See infra Part II.C.
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In reality, constitutional tests developed in prison, if not scrutinized, can
become the law of the land. 8
The Conclusion explores the danger of "one-dimensional law." The
prison religious diet cases have become inexplicably bound with free exercise jurisprudence to the exclusion of other constitutional principles. The
resulting one-dimensional analysis offers little guidance, and judges are forced
to rely on their own discretion. In contrast, the multirights approach can better
guide the judicial analysis, better inform prison administrators, and ultimately
better respect the document that underlies all civil rights on both sides of
the prison wall.

I. THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
In 1987, the Supreme Court ushered in an era of judicial deference to
prison administration in a pair of decisions: Turner v. Safley and O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz. Each decision featured an ambiguous analysis from a divided
Court, foreshadowing the ensuing confusion among circuit courts.
A.

Prisoners' Rights Meet Penological Interest: The Four-Factor
Reasonableness Test in Turer v.Safley

In Turner, inmates housed in the Renz Correctional Institution in Cedar
City, Missouri filed a class action suit challenging the constitutionality of
two Missouri prison regulations. 9 The first regulation prohibited correspondence between inmates at different prisons, and the second regulation
enforced a de facto ban on inmate marriage unless the prison superintendent found compelling interest for the marriage to take place." Writing
for the majority, Justice O'Connor first acknowledged that prisoners
retain constitutional rights in prison.2' Therefore the regulations restricting
inmate correspondence and marriage impinged on inmates' constitutionally
protected freedom of expression and the privacy right of marriage.22 Nevertheless, the Court deferred to the prison administration's perceived need for
regulation and determined that the inmates' constitutional rights should be
balanced against the prison's regulatory concerns. The Court declared, "[Wihen

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See the Conclusion, infra.
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 78 (1987).
Id.at 81-83.
Id.at 85.
See id. at 82.
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a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation
is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.""
Justice O'Connor introduced four fact-intensive factors to determine
whether a regulation is reasonable: (1) The regulation is rationally connected to the legitimate government interests offered to justify the regulation (rational connection);24 (2) alternative means of exercising the right
remain open to prisoners under the regulation (alternative means); 21 (3)
providing accommodation or exceptions for inmates to exercise the asserted
rights impermissibly burdens prison staff, other inmates, or prison resources
(impact of accommodation); 26 (4) the regulation is not an exaggerated

response to prison concerns (exaggerated response). 27 A regulation is an
exaggerated response if a ready alternative exists that fully accommodates
the prisoners at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.28 Applying
these factors, the Court upheld the mail regulation but declared the marriage regulation unconstitutional.29
23.
Id. at 89. The Turner standard of reasonableness is better understood as a test based on
the totality of four factors, rather than a traditional rational basis test used to analyze substantive
due process claims.
24.
Id. at 89-90.
25.
Id. at 90.
26.
Id.
27.
Id. at 90-91.
28.
As a further clarification, Justice O'Connor explained that the last factor
is not a "least restrictive alternative" test: prison officials do not have to set up and then
shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint. But if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully
accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a
court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable
relationship standard.
Id.
29.
Id. at 91. The mail regulation satisfied the "rational connection factor." Prison officials testified that mail between prisons could be used to communicate escape plans, to arrange
violent acts, and to foster prison gang activity. Therefore, accommodating inmates' mail
exchanges endangered the liberty and safety of other prisoners and of prison personnel. Id. at 9192. It also passed the "alternative means" factor because the regulation only barred those communications with other inmates. Prisoners retained the alternative means of exercising their freedom
of expression by communicating with nonprisoners. Id. at 92. Although inmates urged an alternative case-by-case censorship, as practiced in other state prisons, its burden on prison operation
was deemed too great under the "impact of accommodation" factor. Id. The lack of an obvious,
easy alternative to the regulation indicated that the regulation itself was not an "exaggerated
response." Id. at 93. In contrast, Justice O'Connor found no rational connection between marriage and the purported penological interest of avoiding love triangles because "inmate rivalries
are as likely to develop without a formal marriage ceremony as with one." Id. at 98. Neither did
the goal of nurturing self-reliance justify the regulation, since there was no evidence that it had
been a problem. Id. An obvious alternative existed in federal prisons, under which inmates may
marry unless supervisors detect potential security danger, and this alternative rendered the marriage regulation an "exaggerated response." Id. at 97-98. After considering the totality of the four
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The Turner opinion is best known for the reasonableness test. Despite
its universal application as a four-factor test, the different treatment of the
marriage regulation and the mail regulation betrayed two additional considerations. First, Turner demonstrates Justice O'Connor's focus on "fairness"
between gender classes. She felt compelled to discuss the gendered outcome
of the marriage regulation in the following passage:
[T]he rehabilitative objective asserted to support the regulation itself
is suspect .... [Tihe Missouri prison system operated on the basis of
excessive paternalism in that the proposed marriages of all female
inmates were scrutinized carefully even before adoption of the current regulation ...whereas the marriages of male inmates during the
same period were routinely approved. That kind of lopsided rehabilitation concern cannot provide a justification for the ...marriage
rule."30
The evidentiary effect of the disparate treatment is that "the rehabilitative objective [of fostering self-reliance] asserted to support the regulation
itself is suspect."'" Although this analysis was "not necessary to the disposition of this case," Justice O'Connor felt that this information discredited
the justifications offered by the administration and rendered the penological interest itself suspect."
Another aspect of the decision is Justice O'Connor's effort to elevate
the importance of the privacy right to marriage but not the right to send or
receive mail. Apart from the potentially rehabilitative psychological comfort and commitment, she discussed the connection of marriage to other
aspects of law. The religious connotation of marriage amounts to an exercise of religion; therefore, prohibition of marriage would undermine inmates'
religious rights. She also mentioned the existing government programs and
laws that give additional benefits and rights to those who are married,
including government benefit programs, property interests, and custodial
rights. Because marriage triggers more legal rights, its deprivation is more
suspect.33

factors, all of which weighed against the prison administrators' argument, Justice O'Connor invalidated
the marriage regulation. Id. at 99.
30. Id. at 99.
31.
Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 95-96.
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The Right to Worship Meets the Turner Test: Inmates' Free Exercise
Rights in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz

In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,"4 the Court applied the factors announced
in Turner to questions arising under the Free Exercise Clause.35 A prison
regulation requiring inmates to remain in their work area during work hours
prohibited Muslim inmates from returning to the main building to attend
the weekly Jumu'ah ceremony. 6 These inmates alleged that the regulation
violated their right to practice their religion. Justice Rehnquist applied the
Turner test and found that the regulation was "reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives."37
The Court first identified several rational connections between the
regulation and legitimate penological interests under the first "rational
connection" factor. The interest in easing overcrowding and tension during
the day justified the requirement that all minimum-level prisoners work
outside the main facility. The interest in preventing congestion and delay
at the high-risk main gate area and reducing guards' supervisory burden justified the prohibition on inmates returning to the main building. Finally,
the requirement that inmates stay in the work area all day was deemed
rationally connected to the rehabilitative goal of nurturing good work ethics." The "alternative means" factor was also satisfied. Although there were
no alternative ways of practicing Jumu'ah, many venues remained open for
Muslim inmates' religious exercise: They could congregate for prayer and discussion during nonwork hours, access a state-provided inam, receive a nonpork
diet, and participate in a special scheduling arrangement during the monthlong Ramadan observance. 9 Although inmates offered to work on weekends
in place of Friday, the day of the Jumu'ah service, their scheduling accommodation would adversely impact the prison operation. Specifically, a schedule
change would require extra staff time and would drain supervisory resources.
Also, allowing the same inmates to work together would promote the formation
482 U.S. 342 (1987).
34.
U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
35.
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.").
O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 345-46. "Jumu'ah is the central religious ceremony of Muslims,
36.
'comparable to the Saturday service of the Jewish faith and the Sunday service of the various
dissenting) (citation omitted).
Christian sects."' Id. at 360 (Brennan, J.,
Id. at 353.
37.
Id.at 350-51.
38.
Id.at 351-52. An imam is a teacher of the Islamic religion analogous to a rabbi in
39.
Judaism and a priest in Christianity. Ramadan marks the sacred ninth month of the Muslim year
(usually corresponding to a period around November and December of the Gregorian Calendar)
observed with daily fasting from dawn to sunset. See id. at 354.
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of potentially dangerous gangs and power groups.

Finally, a schedule

adjustment would appear as a form of institutional favoritism in the eyes of
non-Muslim inmates, creating a potential source of violence. The institutional difficulties of adopting the inmates' proposal further demonstrated
that the regulation was not an "exaggerated response" because no obvious
easy alternative to the regulation existed." The regulation was easily upheld
under the Turner test.

The Turner test resolved the validity of three regulations against three
different constitutional challenges in quick succession and supplanted the
various tests used among circuits. However, the trailblazing performance masked
the underlying tension within the Court. Turner and O'Lone were both
decided by a one-vote margin.4 Justice Stevens, writing for the four dissenting
Justices in Turner, worried that the new standard would subject inmates to
the mercy of prison officials without adequate constitutional protection.42 Justice
Brennan, writing in O'Lone for the same dissenting Justices, lamented the
demise of prisoners' religious rights.43
The inconsistent application of the Turner test, Justice Stevens observed,
was more problematic than its excessive deference to prison policies.
Turner itself seems to embody two standards of review, a lenient one for the
mail regulation and a strict one for the marriage regulation. 44 Applying the
"lenient" Turner test, the majority upheld the mail regulation even though it
40.
Id. at 353.
41.
In both cases, the majority consisted of Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, White, Powell,
and Scalia. The dissent consisted of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. In Turner,
these four Justices dissented from the mail regulation portion of the opinion and concurred with
the disposition of the marriage regulation.
42.
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 100-01 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
notes:
Application of the standard would seem to permit disregard for inmates' constitutional
rights .... Indeed, there is a logical connection between prison discipline and the use of
bullwhips on prisoners; and security is logically furthered by a total ban on inmate communication, not only with other inmates but also with outsiders who conceivably might
be interested in arranging an attack within the prison or an escape from it.
Id.
43.
See O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan notes:
In my view, adoption of "reasonableness" as a standard of review for all constitutional
challenges by inmates is inadequate to this task .... [T]he message to prison officials is
clear: merely act "reasonably" and your actions will be upheld. If a directive that officials
act "reasonably" were deemed sufficient to check all exercises of power, the Constitution
would hardly be necessary. Yet the Court deems this single standard adequate to restrain
any type of conduct in which prison officials might engage.
Id.
44.
See also Matthew P. Blischak, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz: The State of Prisoners' Religious
Free Exercise Rights, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 453 (1988) (arguing that the Supreme Court misapplied
the Turner standard to O'Lone and unjustifiably limited prisoners' religious freedom).
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was more restrictive than the rule at other Missouri prisons, allowed all mail
between inmates to be banned even though most letters did not implicate
security problems, ignored a valuable rehabilitative interest in letter writing,
and overturned the lower court's finding of fact in favor of prison administrators' testimony." Applying the "strict" Turner test, the majority invalidated
the marriage prohibition on the basis that it was more restrictive than the
rule at other Missouri prisons; it was overbroad for its stated security and
rehabilitative purposes; marriage embodied important virtues; and higher
46
courts must defer to lower courts' fact-based conclusions. Justice Stevens
believed that both regulations should be invalidated and could not fathom
47
how the majority reached different conclusions for the two regulations. His
criticism of the Turner test portends the confusion that has ensued whenever
the lower courts have applied Turner and O'Lone to free exercise issues.
Cases involving a prisoner's religious dietary requests are no exception to
this confusion, as is described in the next subpart.
C.

The Confusing Application of the Turner/O'LoneTest: Circuit
Disagreement Over the Kosher Diet

When presented with the question of whether a prison's failure to provide a religiously appropriate diet violates an inmate's rights, most lower
courts have turned to the Turner test as applied through O'Lone." Nonetheless, as cases involving Jewish inmates' requests for a kosher diet demonstrate,
the application of this test to similar facts and situations has led to divergent
49
outcomes.
In April 2002, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, applying
the Turner test, joined the Eighth and Ninth Circuits in holding that prisons
were required to provide a strict kosher diet."0 However, other courts of appeals
have rejected similar claims under the Turner standard. In 1988, the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that refusal to provide a kosher diet "fully
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 113-14 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
See id. at 115 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
This is what I refer to as the Turner/O'Lone test.
See Jamie Aron Forman, Note, Jewish Prisoners and Their First Amendment Right to a

Kosher Meal: An Examination of the Relationship Between Prison Dietary Policy and Correctional

Goals, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 477 (1999) (describing the various and contrary holdings circuit courts
have reached regarding Jewish inmates' entitlement to kosher diet accommodations).
50. Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2002); see Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d 682
(8th Cir. 2000); Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 1997). But cf. Ben-Avraham v.
Moses, No. 92-35604, 1993 WL 269611, at *1 (9th Cir. July 19, 1993) (denying a Jewish inmate's
request for a kosher diet due to the cost of accommodation).
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accords with the result and reasoning of Turner and O'Lone. '5 The Fourth
Circuit adopted the same position." Interestingly, two circuit courts have
confronted requests for kosher provisions without the help of Turner. The
Eleventh Circuit relied on its own pre-Turner precedents to uphold a prison's
action denying Jewish inmates kosher meals.53 In contrast, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit relied on its own pre-Tumer decision to grant
inmates' requests for a kosher diet.54
In light of these contrary decisions, even judges acknowledge, "The
Court of Appeals cases dealing with inmate requests for religious diets do
not reach a uniform result."5 The Turner/O'Lone test has so far failed to achieve
its stated goal of "formulat[ing] a standard of review for prisoners' constitutional claims that is responsive both to the 'policy of judicial restraint
regarding prisoner complaints and [to] the need to protect constitutional
51.
Kahey v. Jones, 836 F.2d 948 at 951 (5th Cit. 1988).
52.
See Cooper v. Rogers, 788 F. Supp. 255 (D. Md. 1991), affd, Cooper v. Rogers, No. 917735, 1992 WL 60240, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 30, 1992).
53.
In Harrisv. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912 (11th Cit. 1995), the Eleventh Circuit relied on its
precedent, MartineUi v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499 (11th Cit. 1987) without mentioning Turner. In
Martinelli, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order to provide one daily kosher meal
to a Jewish inmate. 817 F.2d at 1507 n.29. The court did permit the plaintiff to eat in the porkfree line and to choose nonpork items when available. Although it was a pre-Turnerdecision, the
court deferred to the budgetary concerns of the prison administration, thus anticipating religious
diet cases after Turner. The Harris court suggested in dicta that the residual right to a religious
diet after Martinelli might not have survived the Supreme Court's Smith decision. Harris, 65 F.3d
at 918.
54.
Bass v. Coughlin, 976 F.2d 98 (2d Cit. 1992) (per curiam) ("[Pirison officials must provide a prisoner a diet that is consistent with his religious scruples."). As early as 1975, the Second
Circuit recognized prisoners' right to kosher food in Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cit.
1975). Subsequently in Bass, 976 F.2d at 99, a 1992 challenge to a prison's failure to provide
kosher meals, the Second Circuit flatly asserted that Turner and O'Lone did not call Kahane into
question because Turner and O'Lone addressed the right to mail, marriage, and worship, but not
the right to a religious diet. Id. at 99. The court was content with its pre-Turner analysis and
granted the inmate accommodation without analyzing the facts under the four-factor test. See also
Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 1999) (relying on Kahane and Bass without mentioning
Turner as late as 1999).
55.
DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 59 n.8 (3d Cit. 2000) (en banc). In one long footnote,
the DeHart court surveyed various prison dietary accommodation cases, featuring roughly equal
numbers of cases granting accommodation, cases denying accommodation, and cases with insufficient facts. Id. The Third Circuit attributed the perceived lack of uniformity to courts' recognition "that the issue in such cases requires a contextual, record-sensitive analysis." Id. Because
different religious dietary restrictions and meal service programs generate different factual patterns, the argument goes, the various results of applying the Turner/O'Lone test could reflect a
healthy sensitivity to the underlying circumstances. For example, all else being equal, it is much
easier to accommodate those who are prohibited from eating pork, than it is to accommodate
those who can only eat ritually slaughtered meat. But this explains only part of the variance. As
the example of kosher meals indicates, factually similar dietary requests met different results
between circuits, suggesting that some variance is due to the underlying legal standards.
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rights."'56 One can only imagine the complexity of meeting the requests of
Buddhist, Rastafarian, Seventh Day Adventist, and Muslim inmates.
Admittedly, the same accommodation can impose different burdens on
different prison facilities, which can lead to different legal outcomes under
the Turner calculus. However, a closer reading of the various opinions suggests
that courts in different circuits have adopted different legal interpretations of
the Turner test. To some courts, a religious diet is one facet of a religious
practice comparable to other forms of religious expression. Thus, when analyzing the "alternative means" factor, the Third Circuit examines "whether
an inmate has alternative means of practicing his or her religion generally,
not whether an inmate has alternative means of engaging in the particular
practice in question."57 In contrast, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits offer two tests
under this factor, one for a "required" religious diet and one for a "recommended" religious diet. s
Under the "impact of accommodation" factor, courts are instructed to give
deference to prison regulations if the cost of accommodation is impermissibly
high. Different courts review the evidence of cost differently and set different
59
standards for measuring what level of cost is impermissible. Similarly, courts
disagree on how to treat evidence of existing accommodation available to
members of other religions or to inmates of other facilities.' In short, the
existing splits among circuit courts echo the double standard Justice Stevens
criticized in his Turner dissent.6 It has also been difficult to extrapolate the
permissible "impact of accommodation" or the scope of the "alternative means"
test from the Free Exercise Clause. Commentators have tried to locate a
brighter line.62 Unfortunately, their brighter line generally presumes a particular
vision of the proper balance, which begs the very purpose of a test-if the proper
balance is known in advance, there is no need for any test.
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
56.
406 (1974)).
DeHart, 227 F.3d at 54.
57.
See Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2002); Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d
58.

873, 877 (9th Cit. 1993).
See infra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
59.
See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
60.
See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
61.
Previous scholarship examining this question often relies on a particular vision of the
62.
proper balance between prisoners' rights and prisons' penological interest. See, e.g., Abraham
Abramovsky, First Amendment Rights of Jewish Prisoners: Kosher Food, Skullcaps, and Beards, 21 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 241 (1994); Eric J.Zogry, Note, Orthodox Jewish Prisoners and the Turner Effect, 56 LA.
L. REV. 905 (1996). The multirights analysis espoused in this Comment attempts to avoid the
debate regarding the level of scrutiny; instead it assumes the reasonableness standard and suggests
a mode of analysis capable of complementing any level of constitutional scrutiny.
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II. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN PRISON RELIGIOUS
DIETARY ACCOMMODATION AND NON-FREE
EXERCISE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Prison religious diet issues need not stay within the confines of the Free
Exercise Clause.63 Nothing in Turner or O'Lone prohibits courts from looking
to other sections of the Bill of Rights.64 Of course, religious dietary accommodation issues are properly analyzed under the Free Exercise Clause of the
Constitution. However, the lack of accommodation can also create a condition of deprivation that violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Similarly, accommodation to one religion but not another may
deprive religious inmates of the equal protection of law. Finally, denying
accommodation on the basis of theological arguments can violate the Establishment Clause prohibition against government entanglement in religious
affairs. Even when there is no blatant constitutional violation, these additional
constitutional principles can provide additional instruction to courts'
analysis of prison religious diet issues, thereby resolving existing circuit splits
under the free exercise Turner/O'Lone test.
While the idea that judges should consider all relevant legal rights is
not new, I call this method the "multirights approach" to contrast it with
the current single (free exercise) right regime. This multirights approach
can add substance to the balancing test, constrain the variation among
courts, and guide them to a better constitutional analysis of religious dietary
accommodation questions. When facts of physical deprivation, discriminatory
accommodation, or church-state entanglement are apparent, courts should
not hesitate to initiate constitutional inquiries under the non-free exercise
provisions. When these facts are absent, the multirights approach can still
guide the current Turner/O'Lone test to ensure that the legal analysis under
the Turner factors remains consistent with constitutional commitments
beyond the Free Exercise Clause.

63.
A small number of commentators make an ingenious move in the area of prisoners' rights.
Jeffrey Welty argues that the restriction on prisoners' religious freedom is a type of unconstitutional
condition of confinement under the Eighth Amendment. Jeffrey Welty, Note, Restrictions on
Prisoners' Religious Freedom as Unconstitutional Conditions of Confinement: An Eighth Amendment
Argument, 48 DUKE L.J. 601 (1998). Robert Tsai argues that prisoners' constitutional litigation
can be viewed as a type of antigovemment speech subject to First Amendment analysis. See Robert
Tsai, Conceptualizing Constitutional Litigation as Anti-Government Expression: A Speech-Centered
Theory of CourtAccess, 51 AM. U. L.REV. 835 (2002).
64.
Turner merely provides courts with a four-factor test to analyze prisoners' civil rights,
and O'Lone does not limit the analysis of religious diet issues to the Free Exercise Clause alone.
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The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Perspective

Without special accommodation, religious inmates face a dilemma
between physical health and spiritual existence. For those inmates who
choose to forgo a noncompliant diet in favor of religious practice, the resultant physical deprivation may create a valid claim under the Cruel and
65
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the prison administration from
imposing inhumane conditions of confinement on inmates, including defi68
cient medical treatment,' overcrowding," physical brutality, and dietary
deprivation.69 The "condition-of-confinement" claim under the Eighth Amendment evolved from these types of cases. In order to successfully challenge
inhumane conditions, inmates must show that they suffered "deprivations denying 'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,"' including "deprivation
70
of a single, identifiable human need such as food," and that the deprivation
7
is the result of "deliberate indifference" on the part of prison officials.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
65.
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685
(1978) ("Confinement in a prison.., is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth
Amendment standards."). For a general discussion on the intersection between religious exercise
and the Eighth Amendment in prison, see Welty, supra note 63 (arguing that a refusal to accommodate
inmates' religious needs can trigger an Eighth Amendment deprivation in theory). Whether or
not inmates successfully state an Eighth Amendment violation, the case law corroborates the type
of deprivations that a devout inmate could potentially suffer. See, e.g., Wong v. Beebe, No. CV01-718-ST, 2002 WL 31548486, at *6 (D. Or. Apr. 5, 2002) (addressing how a matron of a Taoist
sect, who took a lifetime vow of vegetarianism, lived on bread and water during her five-day
detention when the immigration administration refused to provide her a vegetarian diet); United
States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (concerning how a devout Muslim,
who eats only halal meat, ate little or nothing during a day of detention in order to avoid possibly
non-halal food); Lawson v. Liburdi, 114 F. Supp. 2d 31, 34-35 (D.R.I. 2000) (involving a
Rastafarian inmate who was denied an Ital diet and resorted to bread and water as his only meal
for months, leading to stomach discomfort, vomiting, diarrhea, and headaches requiring medical
attention).
See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101-08 (1976) (applying the Eighth Amend66.
ment to a condition-of-confinement case).
See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
67.
See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
68.
See Hutto, 437 U.S. at 683 (finding that the condition of solitary confinement, including
69.
a prolonged diet of bread and water or of calorie-deficient "grue" constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation); Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock County, Tex., 929 F.2d 1078 (5th Cit. 1991)
(holding that withholding food for twelve consecutive days as a disciplinary measure constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment).
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,304 (1991).
70.
Id. at 301-05 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, and Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). See Jolly
71.
v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 481 (2d Cit. 1996) (observing that deliberate indifference does not
require "conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm"); Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37
F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that it is enough to show that a prison official "knows that
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Because a number of judicial decisions recognize diet deprivation as cruel
and unusual punishment, many prisons now provide hearty meals designed
by nutritionists. 2 Ironically, even though the prison diet jurisprudence
developed from a line of Eighth Amendment challenge redressing the plight
of Muslim inmates in the 1960s," the typical religious diet analysis under
the Turner/O'Lone test is devoid of any Eighth Amendment inquiry. 4 Against
this background, the D.C. Circuit's Eighth Amendment analysis of prison
religious diet issues in Caldwell v. Caesar" is an exception.
1.

Religion-Based Dietary Deprivation as a Conditionof-Confinement Claim

In Caldwel, a member of the Liberal Catholic Church who requested a
vegetarian diet for religious reasons argued that his meals violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because the so-called "vegetarian
meals" were merely regular meals without meat and no protein substituted
for the meat. Also, at least one meal was not edible because the entire plate
was contaminated with meat gelatin. The prison administrators argued, and
the court agreed, that the Liberal Catholic Church did not mandate vegetarianism, and that the plaintiffs alleged deprivation was therefore the
result of a personal choice. 6 Nevertheless, the court held that "whether the
inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it"); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839 (1994).
72.
See, e.g., Hutto, 437 U.S. at 678; Jenkins v. Werger, 564 F. Supp. 806 (D. Wyo. 1983).
In addition, quasi-agricultural subsidy programs, unlimited labor to process raw ingredients, the
economy-of-scale saving in bulk purchases, and the concern of food-related riot encourage (read:
require) prisons to provide handcrafted hearty meals. See LEVENSON,supra note 4, at 203, 208-16.
73. More specifically, these inmates were Black Muslims. See, e.g., Barnett v. Rogers, 410
F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
74.
See, e.g., Wesley v. Kalos, No. 97 CIV. 1598(RWS), 1997 WL 767557, at *1, *4
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1997). In Wesley, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
refused to recognize an Eighth Amendment violation when the prison refused to provide dietary
accommodation for Muslim inmates because the inmates had not "provided any authority for the
proposition that denial of halal food in prison would rise to the level necessary to be deemed cruel
and unusual under the Eighth Amendment." Id.
75. 150 F. Supp. 2d 50 (2001).
76. Id. at 65. The Court notes:
Rev. Delahunt testified that each member of the Liberal Catholic Church should determine his "own level of vegetarian practice after carefully considering his physiological
and hygienic status so that the health is maintained and enhanced and not imperished
[sic]." Thus, Defendants suggest, it was plaintiffs own choice to decline to eat if a nonvegetarian meal was served, a choice not mandated by his religious beliefs.
Id. Interestingly, in a separate section addressing the plaintiffs free exercise claim, the court
noted that a vegetarian diet is "strongly encouraged by the Liberal Catholic Church" and therefore there is "a genuine issue as to the nature of Plaintiffs religious beliefs and the extent to which

HeinOnline -- 51 UCLA L. Rev. 1166 2003-2004

A Prisoner'sRight to Religious Diet

1167

meals actually served Plaintiff were so lacking in nutrition on sufficient
occasions as to deprive him of adequate food necessary to maintain his
health" was a question of fact that precluded the defendant's motion for
summary judgment.77
Caldwell shows that dietary deprivation arising out of religious dietary
issues is a condition-of-confinement claim cognizable under the Eighth
Amendment. A makeshift religious diet would violate the Constitution
if it substantially failed to meet an inmate's nutritional needs." This is not
surprising in itself-a nutritionally deficient diet would violate the Eighth
Amendment even without the religious aspect.79 The nutritionally poor
accommodation in Caldwell is actually unusual in the religious diet context.
The typical deprivation stems from the lack of religious diet. Thus, deprivations usually result when a prisoner refuses to eat part of a nutritious,
but religiously prohibited, meal. The administrator may argue that the
inmate "chooses" to forgo the food. The prisoner may counter that he or
she has no choice but to avoid the food and that the administrator acts with
deliberate indifference by giving him or her food prohibited by his or
her religion.
Does a prison official's decision not to accommodate constitute "deliberate indifference" when the official is aware of the inmate's refusal to eat
noncompliant food? A Second Circuit prison case involving tuberculosis testing
suggests that the answer is "yes."8 In Jolly v. Coughlin,"'a Rastafarian inmate
alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment when New York state prison
administrators confined him in a "medical keeplock area" for three years,
and he was only allowed to leave the cell for one ten-minute shower per week.
adherence to a vegetarian diet is essential to his religion," which needs to be resolved by a jury.
Id. at 58.
77.
Id. at 65.
78.
Along this line of reasoning, the court noted that the inmate was able to purchase tuna
fish when his nonvegetarian meal was inadequate. Id. The court did not specify the importance of the
tuna purchase. It could show that even if a prohibited protein source is served on the plate, an inmate
who refuses to ingest the forbidden protein could avoid protein deprivation by supplementing his
or her diet with canteen purchases.

79.

Cf. LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1991). In LaFevers, administrators denied a

Seventh Day Adventist inmate's request for a special vegetarian diet. The Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit concluded, "'the mere denial of a requested vegetarian diet [was] insufficient to
establish a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim,"' id. at 1120 (quoting LaFevers v. Saffle, Order
at 5 (D. Colo. Dec. 5, 1990)), when the inmate was "given extra servings of vegetables when they
[were] available, [was] provided with food when the prison menu [did] not include vegetables, and
[was] given three meals each day," id.
80.
The following analysis of the role of prisoners' choice and prisons' control in a religion-

based condition-of-confinement claim are derived from Welty, supra note 63, at 611-12, 623.
81.
76 F.3d 468 (2d Cit. 1996).
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The prisoner was confined to the area because he refused to take the annual
tuberculosis test, which involved injecting a small amount of purified
protein into the skin.82 The prisoner refused the test on the grounds that
"accepting artificial substances into the body is a sin under the tenets of
83
Rastafarianism.
Prison administrators argued that they did not act with deliberate
indifference: The plaintiff "held the keys to his cell" because "he would
have been permitted exercise had he simply submitted." The administrators
cited earlier cases in which inmates who lost benefits because of their
choice to refuse a strip search or their reclassification as an escape risk were
left without remedy. 4 The Second Circuit noted that the previous litigants
"were not motivated by their sincere religious beliefs.""5 In contrast, the
defendants in Jolly placed the plaintiff "in the position of choosing to
follow his religious beliefs or to improve his conditions of confinement"-a
choice that "is not meaningful, much less constitutional."86 The court
held that the administrators' awareness of the condition of deprivation was
sufficient to show that they had acted with deliberate indifference.87
The Second Circuit's analysis is theoretically sound, and the Rastafarian inmate's dilemma is directly applicable to the religious inmate who
refuses to eat noncompliant food. U.S. prisons are not like Australia during
Victorian England, where ostracized criminals were left to seek their own
food in the wilderness away from civilization.8 The U.S. prisons are environments of "total control,"89 and religious prisoners cannot, in any real sense,

82.
Id. at 476. Regulations limiting the period of exercise in the extreme have been found
to violate the Eighth Amendment in the past. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686
(1978).
83. Jolly, 76 F.3d at 472.
84.
Id. at 480 (citing Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), and Rivera v.
Senkowski, 62 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1995)).
85.
Id. at 481.

86.
87.

Id.
Id.

See generally ROBERT HUGHES, THE FATAL SHORE (1988).
89.
See Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 550 (W.D. Wis. 1972). The court notes:
[Pirison is a complex of physical arrangements and of measures, all wholly governmental, all
wholly performed by agents of government, which determine the total existence of certain
human beings (except perhaps in the realm of the spirit, and inevitably there as well)
from sundown to sundown, sleeping, waking, speaking, silent, working, playing, viewing,
eating, voiding, reading, alone, with others .... State governments have not undertaken
to require members of the general adult population to rise at a certain hour, retire at a
certain hour, eat at certain hours, live for periods with no companionship whatever, wear
certain clothing, or submit to oral and anal searches after visiting hours, nor have state
governments undertaken to prohibit members of the general adult population from
88.
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"choose" what they eat. In contrast, an administrator's decision to provide
or not to provide an accommodation is surely intentional. Thus, an
administrator who continues to deny accommodation, despite his awareness
that devout inmates are suffering from hunger, must be acting with deliberate indifference.
The Eighth Amendment analysis outlined through the combination of
Caldwel and Jolly mends one fault line underlying the Turner test. In the
Turner dissent, Justice Stevens announced rhetorically, "[T]here is a
logical connection between prison discipline and the use of bullwhips
on prisoners." 9 His concern was that courts can trace many regulations to
a reasonable penological interest, and draconian rules may meet the
Turner requirement too easily. A well-analyzed Eighth Amendment
claim can mitigate this defect. In the religious diet context, both the
condition-of-confinement analysis and the TurnerlO'Lone test should
be required-the Turner/O'Lone test guards the positive religious
interest, and the Eighth Amendment defends an inmate's "minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities" such as food.9" These two tests complement each other doctrinally. Just as bullwhips will not pass muster
under the Eighth Amendment, neither will a religiously unacceptable
diet. 92
The condition-of-confinement analysis should be extended to provide
relief for devout inmates who suffer prolonged deprivation from nonaccommodation. Courts could apply an Eighth Amendment analysis following Caldwell with a showing of sufficient physical deprivation. Religious
choice to avoid certain food should not insulate the food policy from challenge. Instead, the fact that a religious inmate is forced to choose between
food and religion should by itself suggest that the administrators acted with
deliberate indifference.

speaking to one another, wearing beards, embracing their spouses, or corresponding with

their lovers.
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Morales,
340 F. Supp. at 550); see also Welty, supra note 63, at 612.
90.
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 101 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991); see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
91.
92.
It is only in the last twenty years that courts have limited the religious diet claim to the
First Amendment, offering no rationale for the change. Earlier prison religious diet cases regularly
intertwined the free exercise rights with cruel and unusual punishment concerns. See supra notes
66, 73, and accompanying text.
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The Medical Cost of Nonaccommodation
as a Turner/O'Lone Consideration

For all the problems a condition-of-confinement claim could solve,
however, it is not completely satisfying on its own. The Eighth Amendment
prohibits dietary deprivation but does not require religious accommodation
per se. One potentially constitutional "solution" to an inmate's refusal to eat
is forced feeding. Applying the Turner test in conjunction with the Eighth
Amendment would prevent forced feeding because the possibility of final
outcome should reshape the "impact of accommodation" factor of Turner's
reasonableness analysis. The following hypothetical extension of Caldwell
illustrates the interconnectedness between the Eighth Amendment and the
Turner/O'Lone analysis.
Suppose prisoner Jones, a Seventh Day Adventist, requests a vegetarian diet. The administration denies the request in order to avoid excessive
costs, the burden on the staff, and the appearance of favoritism. Jones can
give up the dietary practice and eat the regular prison diet; alternatively, he
can continue the dietary practice and eat only the nonmeat portion of the
regular meal.93 The constitutional inquiry ends if the partial meal can satisfy
Jones' physical needs. But if the nonmeat portion were inadequate, then
Jones would suffer physical deprivation deserving of attention. The prison may
ignore it, or it may provide food in the form of a medically prescribed meal or
medical forced feeding. There are four administrative moments in this chain of
events: the original decision to deny accommodation, the decision to ignore
dietary deprivation, the decision to provide a medical meal, and the decision
to order a medical forced feeding.94
The decision to deny accommodation is the proper subject of the
Turner/O'Lone test. Indifference to religious inmates' dietary deprivation creates
93.
This scenario also could include an instance when the prison tried to accommodate the
inmate by removing the offending item.
94.
It is interesting to note that the highly invasive medical feeding procedure probably will
not satisfy the free exercise Turner/O'Lone test. Under the "rational connection" factor, cost control
and administrative ease will no longer justify the decision to medically force feed our Adventist.
If keeping Jones alive is the penological interest, then a vegetarian diet during regular meal hours
can achieve the same result. Under the "alternative means" factor, the physical restraint would
deprive all means of religious exercise save private prayer. However, if private prayer constitutes
sufficient alternative means of exercising religion, then the prison would no longer need to
accommodate anyone under any religion. See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 1993).
Under the third Turner factor, the impact of accommodating Jones through a vegetarian diet pales
in comparison to the personnel disruption and medical expense. Finally, it is also probably an
exaggerated response to prison concerns if giving Jones a vegetarian diet would solve the problem
at de minimis cost.
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an Eighth Amendment violation.95 Short of the Adventist giving up his dietary
practice or the prison providing a religious dietary accommodation in some
form, the analysis necessarily proceeds to the medically prescribed
vegetarian diet and forced feeding. If the vegetarian diet comports with his
religion, Jones can finally consume a complete diet. If it is not, then he
continues to deteriorate, to the point that he requires medical forced
feeding.96
This hypothetical situation reveals what has been heretofore omitted
from the existing Turner/O'Lone analysis: that the Eighth Amendment
requires the prison to feed those inmates who want food.97 The current
"impact of accommodation" factor under the Turner/O'Lone test assumes
that religious inmates' dietary needs can be met even when there is no
accommodation. In reality, there are only two options in the final analysis
when the inmate refuses religiously objectionable food. Either the inmate
has to surrender the dietary commitment, or else the prison has to force
pureed spaghetti and meatball through his nose.9" An Eighth Amendmentconscious Turner analysis requires courts to realize that the prison administration does not face a choice between religious accommodation and
nonaccommodation, but rather a choice between religious accommodation
and medical intervention.' Accordingly, the real impact of accommodation
95.
See supra Part II.A.1.
96.
Medical feeding in prison usually involves strapping the unwilling inmate to a bed or
chair. A plastic tube is inserted into the stomach through the nose; this sometimes causes irritation
and triggers the gag reflex. Food puree is pumped through the tube into the inmate's stomach. To
prevent the inmate from pulling out the tube, the inmate is often left strapped to the chair for the
next meal. See, e.g., Walker v. Horn, 286 F.3d 705, 708 (3d Cir. 2002).
97.
This Comment does not endorse or reject forced feeding; it only acknowledges that the
prison will probably be allowed to force feed starving inmates in the United States. For decisions
upholding administrators' decisions to force feed inmates, see In re Soliman, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1238
(N.D. Ala. 2001); In re Sanchez,. 577 F. Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93 (N.H.
1984); Laurie v. Senecal, 666 A.2d 806 (R.I. 1995). But see Bouvia v. Super. Ct., 179 Cal. App.
3d 1127 (Ct. App. 1986); Zant v. Prevatte, 286 S.E.2d 715, 716 (1982).
98.
No hyperbole is intended. The food puree often contains ingredients from the dinner
line. See, e.g., Walker, 286 F.3d at 708. The court notes:
Walker informed medical personnel that he did not eat meat or milk products as both
foods caused his stomach to be upset. Notwithstanding that warning, and acknowledging that Walker's medical records verified that he was a vegetarian, Dr. Lasky told
Walker that he would be force-fed the foods that were being served to the general prison
population. Walker was then force fed liquefied liver and mashed potatoes containing
milk.
Id.
99.
The analysis assumes that religious inmates would choose hunger over objectionable
food. This is a fair assumption. Most prisons test inmates' religious sincerity prior to granting
special-diet status. These sincere inmates deserve the presumption that they would choose hunger
over food that does not comport with their religion. Moreover, by the time their cases reach trial,
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is the difference between the tangible and intangible cost of religious
accommodation and those of medical forced feeding.
Knowing the real cost of nonaccommodation makes the Turner test
easier to apply. Currently, different circuits have very different ideas of what
is de minimis or what impact is acceptable, even when all the costs of
accommodation are translated into comparable dollar terms. Some courts
claim that any cost in addition to the regular diet is more than de minimis,
which effectively rejects all dietary requests.'" ° On the other hand, other courts
understand that accommodation necessarily entails a spending leeway.' °'
The cost of medical forced feeding would provide a reasonable standard
against which the institutional impact of accommodation or cost of alternative food service can be compared. The administration would be justified to
deny the religious diet if the cost and disruption of accommodation
exceeded the cost of the medical procedure.' 2 On the other hand, when the
medical procedure costs more than the dietary accommodation, dietary
accommodation may be the most economic and administratively feasible route.
Another reason favoring the use of medical cost as a yardstick is that, unlike
the ambiguity inherent in the phrase de minimis, the cost and burden of
medical intervention is readily available to the court.
3.

Answers to Counterarguments

Prison officials worry that they would lose the ability to control defiant
prisoners should they give in to threats of self-destructive starvation by
meeting religious inmates' dietary demands. This has often been the winning
defense justifying the administration's decision to force feed inmates instead

inmates would probably have ample opportunity to display their willingness to suffer hunger, and
courts can use this information in the Turner analysis.
100.
In Kahey v. Jones, the Fifth Circuit thought it "obvious that purchasing, storing and
preparing food for one prisoner out of hundreds.., would impose more than de minimis cost on
the prison." 836 F.2d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1988).
101.
The Tenth Circuit declared that an additional expense of $13,000 a year to accommodate an inmate's kosher request is de minimis in light of the $8.5 million annual budget for food
procurement. Beerheide v. Suther, 286 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 2002). Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit found that the cost of accommodating seventy Jewish inmates out of 12,000 inmates with
frozen kosher meals at $5.00 a day instead of the regular meals at $0.84 a day was de minimis.
Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1997).
102.
If the administration included the cost of medically feeding the inmate in the initial
Turner calculation, but still decided against accommodation because the cost of the religious diet
would be too high, then inmates cannot later claim that prison officials deliberately imposed a
condition that is cruel and unusual. Thus an Eighth Amendment-sensitive Turner/O'Lone analysis
can fend off later liability.
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of giving in to hunger strikes or political fasting. °3 By extension, the prison
officials must be permitted to force feed inmates without accommodating
their dietary needs.
This argument does not apply to those inmates who refuse nonaccommodating meals. To a religious inmate, refusing forbidden food is a religious
end in itself, not a vehicle to carry on a political battle or power struggle
with the prison administrators. Nor is it used as a tool to grab media attention or manipulate the popular sentiment. The religious inmates are not
threatening self-destruction but seeking self-preservation in maintaining
their religious purity. If the administration wishes to avoid the appearance
of cruelty, the legitimate penological purpose of avoiding the appearance of
hostility or weakness during a standoff situation should tip the Turner analysis
in favor of accommodation in the first place, and there should be even less

reason to refuse an accommodation. When medical intervention costs more
than the impact of accommodation, hubris alone should not support forced
feeding if the only reason to maintain the intervention is to avoid the appearance of weakness.
4.

Summary

A concurrent application of the Turner/O'Lone test and the condition
of confinement analysis would give due credit to both "religion" and "diet."
Courts should conduct an independent Eighth Amendment condition-ofconfinement analysis on whether inmates receive proper diets. To further
comply with the Eighth Amendment mandate within the Turner/O'Lone test,
courts should assess the "impact of accommodation" factor against the price
and burden of the medical forced-feeding program. This guideline provided
by the Eighth Amendment is logical, constitutional, and determinable, and
would hopefully alleviate some of the ambiguities now existing under the
TurnerlO'Lone test.
B. The Equal Protection Perspective
Modem litigation of religious diet issues often involves adherents of
minority religions against a backdrop of different levels of accommodation
at different correctional facilities. When a makeshift, arbitrary religious
meal plan fulfills some inmates' religious dietary needs but not others, the
103.
See, e.g., In re Soliman, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D. Ala. 2001); In re Sanchez, 577 F.
Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Laurie v. Senecal, 666 A.2d 806 (R.I. 1995).
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disparate treatment may violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, most courts currently analyze religious dietary accommodation cases only under the Free Exercise Clause, applying the
Turner/O'Lone test, even when the cases contain a possible equal protection
violation. At least one commentator has suggested that prison halal accommodation should be analyzed under the Equal Protection Clause and not
04
the First Amendment.
The Equal Protection Clause requires the state to treat similarly situated people alike. 5 In a free society, regulations purposefully discriminating
against individuals are subject to different levels of judicial scrutiny depending
the basis of the discriminatory treatment."° Religious discrimination entails
the strict scrutiny standard, under which a law must be necessary to serve a
compelling government interest to be found constitutional."7 This principle
has been previously extended to the prison setting in a more dilute form. 8
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit provides a contemporary application of the equal protection analysis of religious dietary accommodation
issues in DeHartv. Horn.19

104. See Rain Levy Minns, Note: Food Fights: Redefining the Current Boundariesof the Government's Positive Obligation to Provide Halal, 17 J.L. & POL. 713, 733-37 (2001) (arguing that the
government should legislate halal consumer protection laws and provide halal food in schools and
prisons). I sympathize with Minns' objection to disparate treatment of Muslim and Jewish inmates
and her desire to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment. Unlike Minns, I believe the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment values can mutually support each other, and I identify case law
supporting the Fourteenth Amendment approach. However, Minns cannot be faulted for not
conducting a full analysis of the issue because the goal of her note was to promote halal food in
different contexts.
105.
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
106.
Outside the prison, discrimination based on a "suspect class" is subjected to heightened
judicial scrutiny. For example, strict scrutiny is applied to laws that discriminate on the basis of
race. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) ("Classifications based solely upon race
must be scrutinized with particular care."). Sex discrimination is reviewed under an intermediate
level of scrutiny. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Laws discriminating on other
grounds will be upheld if they reasonably relate to legitimate government interest. See Ry. Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
107.
See, e.g., Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) ("[Llaws discriminating among religions are subject to strict scrutiny.");
Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995
SUP. Cr. REV. 323, 324 (1995) ("[Wlhen the Court discovered a religious classification, it treated
it as 'suspect' and demanded a high level of justification.")
108.
See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,322 (1972) ("If Cruz was a Buddhist and if he was denied
a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow
prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts, then there was palpable discrimination
by the State against the Buddhist religion."); Patel v. Wooten, 15 Fed. Appx. 647 (10th Cir.
2001) (unpub.).
109.
227 F.3d 47 (3d Cit. 2000) (en banc).
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Religion-Based Dietary Discrimination as an Equal
Protection Violation

DeHart was an inmate at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institute
(PSC) at Greene (the Greene facility) who discovered Buddhism while serving a life sentence. DeHart requested a vegetarian diet consistent with his
Buddhist beliefs, including a cup of soymilk and increased portions of the
nonmeat and nondairy items from the regular menu to replace the meat items.
The administration denied the request, and DeHart sought relief in federal
court under both the Free Exercise Clause and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution. Although all inmates at the Greene facility received the
same meal,"0 the PSC provided Jewish inmates with a kosher diet at another
facility."' DeHart argued that the decision to provide Jewish inmates with
kosher meals but not to provide Buddhist inmates with lower-cost vegetarian meals was a form of religious discrimination violating the Equal Protection
Clause.
The Third Circuit acknowledged a possible equal protection violation:
"A fair inference can be drawn ...that the relevant disparity in treatment
was the result of deliberate choice."".2 The court applied the Turner test to
DeHart's equal protection claim and asked whether the distinction between
Buddhist inmates and Jewish inmates was reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest. The administration distinguished the two scenarios,
reasoning that the kosher diet is "a commandment of the Orthodox Jewish
faith," while the vegetarian diet is an "expression of faith" rather than "a
commandment of Buddhism."'" 3 This answer did not satisfy the Third Circuit:
"[H]ow this distinction is reasonably grounded in legitimate penological
concerns, and any nexus between the two[,] is not self-evident.""' 4 The court
remanded the case for findings on whether the disparate treatment was justified by any legitimate reason."'
The only exception was the therapeutic diet. The therapeutic meal consisted of the
110.
same food served in a regular meal, but in different proportions according to the medical needs of
individual inmates. DeHart, 227 F.3d at 49.
The defending administration in DeHart had been the defendant in a prior religious
111.
dietary accommodation case, Johnson v.Horn, 150 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 1998). In Johnson, the
administration was voluntarily providing a kosher diet including milk, uncut fruit, vegetables, and
a nutritional supplement to Jewish inmates. Id. at 280.
DeHart, 227 F.3d at 61 n.10.
112.
113. Id.at 61.
114. Id.
115. Id. The Third Circuit noted that, even though both Johnson and DeHart occurred
under the same administration, the plaintiffs in the two cases stayed in different prison facilities.
Id. at 59. The court was aware that the disparate treatment might have been due to the difference
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When the state circumscribes a religious practice in the context of one
religion but not another, the Constitution surely gives the injured party a
right to raise both a free exercise claim and an equal protection claim. An
equal protection claim is a claim independent from free exercise and cannot
be reduced to merely a free exercise claim-even if both claims invoke the
Turner test."6 The Turner/O'Lone test asks whether a particular nonaccommodating food regulation may nonetheless serve legitimate penological
goals. The equal protection analysis in DeHart, riding on a Turner framework, asks instead whether a particular discriminationmay nonetheless serve
legitimate penological goals. Thus the focus of an equal protection Turner
claim is not the treatment per se, but the difference in treatment. Another
way of delineating the differences is to look at the relevant penological interests. Budgetary concern is a legitimate reason to deny accommodation under the
free exercise Turner/O'Lone test, and the vegetarian meal entails purchase of
the special soy milk. However, budgetary concern cannot be a legitimate
reason for the discriminatory treatment because it does not explain why the
prison would provide the more expensive kosher meat and not the cheaper
soy milk.'17 A concomitant equal protection analysis here is wholly consistent
with the constitutional scheme and not redundant after applying the free
exercise analysis.
Courts should adopt DeHart's equal protection analysis when prison
regulations accommodate one religion but not another. The proper inquiry,
following the DeHart approach, is whether the difference in accommodation can be justified by a legitimate penological interest, judged under the
original Turner factors. Interestingly, the DeHart court did not only contemplate an equal protection claim for prison dietary accommodation, but

in the facilities between the two prison sites and not due to the religious difference. Id. at 61.
The case was remanded for finding on the difference in religion on penological interest. Id.
Meanwhile, the fact that Jewish inmates were accommodated without problems suggests that the
administration had found a special diet practicable in the past. Id. at 58-59.
116.
The DeHart opinion is misleading when it states "Turner is equally applicable [to the equal
protection claim], and the appropriate analysis for this claim is the same as that for DeHart's Free
Exercise claim." Id. at 61. Subsequent discussion in the opinion suggests that the standard of analysis is
the same in the abstract, but the actual Turner inquiry varied according to the underlying right.
Id.
117.
On the other hand, a penological interest justifying discriminatory treatment probably
justifies nonaccommodation under the free exercise TurnerlO'Lone test as well. For example, a
prison may justify the discrimination on the basis of administrative ease if kosher meat is readily
available, while soy milk needs to be airlifted to the prison. Administrative ease would also justify
a denial of accommodation under the Turner/O'Lone test.
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also envisioned a free exercise Turner/O'Lone test tempered with equal protection concerns, as we will see in the next subpart."'
2.

Evidence of Unequal Accommodation
as a Turner/O'Lone Consideration

The DeHart court discussed the effect of disparate treatment between
Jewish inmates and Buddhist inmates when analyzing an inmate's free exercise claim under the Turner/O'Lone test, in addition to discussing this
treatment in the equal protection context. When providing the guideline
for remand, the DeHart court highlighted the discriminatory treatment
as "[olne piece of evidence regarding the impact of DeHart's request... [that
was] particularly worthy of mention. '"9 The court cited two reasons. First,
discriminatory treatment affects how courts assess the extent of which an
accommodation would burden the prison resource and staff (the "impact of
accommodation" factor). Because "the dietary needs of Jewish inmates are
apparently accommodated without substantial negative consequences in terms
of efficiency and security," the DeHart court explained, "treatment of Jewish
casts substantial doubt on [the] assertion that accommodating
inmates ...
DeHart's request would result in significant problems for the prison community."'20 Second, it affects how courts assess whether the problematic regulation is an exaggerated response to prison concerns (the "exaggerated
is difficult to see how one can deterresponse" factor). The court opined: "[I]t
mine under the ["exaggerated response"] factor whether DeHart's requested
diet places more than a de minimis burden on prison resources without
taking the treatment of Jewish inmates into account.''.
DeHart illustrates that the presence of discriminatory accommodation
limits what the administration can argue under the Turner/O'Lone test.
Under the "impact of accommodation" factor, the prison administrators
argued that the financial and personnel impact of the vegetarian accommodation were unacceptable. However, the inconsistent accommodation of
Jewish inmates and the Buddhist inmate undermined the scope and credibility
of the cost argument. Similarly, the existence of accommodation to some
group casts doubt on the propriety of a rule barring accommodation to

118.
119.
120.
121.

See infra Part II.B.2.
DeHart, 227 F.3d at 58.
Id.
Id. at 58-59.
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Buddhist inmates on efficiency and security grounds.'2 2 Moreover, these
individual determinations reveal the court's willingness to receive discriminatory practice as evidence for its Turner/O'Lone test calculus. The Turner
factors, when applied to free exercise issues through O'Lone, say nothing
about how courts should evaluate discriminatory practices. Courts' evaluation of facially discriminatory practices or inconsistent accommodations can
engender policy disagreements regarding the proper amount of deference."'
By appealing to the equal protection jurisprudence, the DeHart court found a
constitutional warrant to incorporate evidence of discriminatory treatment
into the Turner/O'Lone analysis without becoming embroiled in the normative policy debate.
This strategy should sound familiar because it mirrors Justice O'Connor's
analysis of gender inequality and institutional variation in the original
Turner opinion.' In both cases, discriminatory treatment may take the form
of disparate treatment of people in discrete classes across lines of gender or
religion. Alternatively, it may arise out of unexplained regulatory differences
between different correctional facilities. In either case, equal protection
analysis can limit a prison administration's universe of explanatory possibilities
or reveal illegitimate considerations. To the extent that the application of
the equal protection analysis removes inconsistency and discrimination
and ensures that reasoning under the Turner/O'Lone test complies with the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, it enhances the methodological exactitude and constitutional legitimacy of the Turner/O'Lone test.
Several courts have infused their Turner/O'Lone dietary analysis with similar
12
reasoning.

122.
In addition, prison administrations often justify the lack of special diet in terms of
reducing the appearance of favoritism. A system of discriminatory accommodation would undermine, even contradict, this apparent penological interest.
123.
Deferential courts allow each prison to craft local rules that discriminate among different prison populations while more searching judges view discriminatory treatment with suspicion.
The opposing views between the Turner majority and Justice Stevens in a footnote of the original
Turner decision clearly reflect the two standards of assessing discriminatory practice. See Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, at 93 n.* (1987).
124.
See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
125.
See, e.g., Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 1997). The equal protection
analysis is even more decisive for the Ninth Circuit's analysis. In Ashelman, an Orthodox Jewish
inmate sought strict kosher food when the prison accommodated the dietary requirements of groups
including Muslims, Sikhs, and Seventh Day Adventists without disruption. Id. at 678. Under
these circumstances, the court did not find the difficulties envisioned by the prison insurmountable.
On the contrary it helped demonstrate the existence of "obvious, easy alternatives" that "tip[ ] the
balance in favor of Ashelman's free exercise right." Id. at 678.
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Answers to Counterarguments

A number of courts currently ignore allegations of unequal accommodation under a free exercise analysis and an equal protection analysis out of
deference to prison administration. Courts should give some deference to prison
administrations because penal institutions are necessarily restrictive environments, and imprisonment by definition limits an individual's freedom.
Furthermore, the officers possess special knowledge about how to manage the
day-to-day operation of a complex system. Therefore, prison regulations
should not be subjected to a barrage of tests.'26
The deference argument is more convincing, appropriate, and necessary in the free exercise context than it is in the equal protection context.
Unlike the Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection Clause does not protect
any particular substantive right. Rather, it underscores a fundamental notion
of equity and justice by erecting a procedural safeguard against unfair treatment. Penological goals and prison environment may justify constraints on
inmates' religious freedom as required by the prison setting, but they do not
justify unequal constraints on individual rights. Insofar as retribution and
rehabilitation are valid penological interests, the notions of just desert and
moral character development should require the prison administration to
treat the inmates equally whenever possible. Whether the claimant is a
prisoner does not matter for the equal protection analysis. Moreover, prisons
may be experts at determining within the prison the boundary between
legitimate penological interest and specific First Amendment rights, but an
ambiguous boundary applicable to some but not others calls that expertise
into question. Prison administrations should be required to put courts at
ease that their apparent discriminatory treatment is itself rooted in legitimate
penological interests. Courts should guard the equal protection claim at
least as stringently as they guard the free exercise claim.
Furthermore, asking the equal protection question does not actually vary
the degree of deference. Courts may still conduct a cursory equal protection
Turner analysis and defer to prisons' explanations. Nonetheless, such an
analysis would momentarily focus the courts' attention on a question of
fairness which may otherwise never have been asked during a purely fr~e
exercise application of the Turner/O'Lone test, especially when the same
court would conduct the Turner/O'Lone test in a deferential manner.
An equal protection analysis is actually consistent with Turner's
notion of judicial deference. In Turner the Court paid deference to the mail
126.

See, e.g., Kahey v. Jones, 836 F.2d 948, 950 (5th Cir. 1988).
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regulation even though it was applied differently in different prisons because
different security ratings between prisons permitted the administration to
adopt a stricter mail regulation in some prisons. Nowhere did the opinion
equate deference with a blind acceptance that does not question the basis of
the discriminating policy. Asking constitutional questions is the essence of
judicial review and should not be viewed as impermissible judicial meddling
with prison operations. Deference does not prevent courts from asking equal
protection-related questions in the first place; it merely means that courts
ought to accept the prison's reasonable answers and explanations. Therefore
the equal protection analysis is consistent with the standard of deference in
Turner and O'Lone.
At the other end of the spectrum, prisoners' rights advocates may worry
that an equal protection claim for disparate religious diet or an equal
protection-conscious Turner/O'Lone test would make religious dietary
accommodation impossibly difficult to implement. Reasonable administrators who are willing to provide some accommodation may fear that a
strong Equal Protection Clause will force the prison to choose between
the burden of accommodating all requests and the burden of liability for
granting discriminatory accommodations.'27 To shut the lid of the accommodation Pandora's box, administrators may impose a plan of blanket
nonaccommodation-with the result that no one may receive religious dietary accommodation.
A strong Equal Protection Clause will impose more restrictions on
the implementation of dietary accommodation program. This is a benefit, not a drawback: It will ensure that dietary programs comply with
the Constitution. The administration should not resort to blanket nonaccommodation to avoid possible equal protection liability, because the zeroaccommodation policy will incur liability under Bureau of Prison regulations, the
Free Exercise Clause, and the Eighth Amendment.'28 Neither should prison
administrators fear that total accommodation would bankrupt prison budgets: The Turner test already internalizes the impact of accommodation, and
127.
For an example of nonaccommodation motivated by the desire to avoid litigation, see
id. at 948. The court states:
[Ihf one such dietary request is granted, similar demands will proliferate, with two possible
results: either accommodation of such demands will place an undue burden on the prison
system, or the prisons would become entangled with religion while drawing fine and
searching distinctions among various free exercise claimants .... The second alternative
could result in troubling discrimination against prisoners practicing uncommon religions,
as majority religions are accommodated.
Id. at 950 n. 1.
128.
See supra Part I.A.
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administrators are allowed to deny dietary requests based on budgetary concerns. These are all reasons why the Equal Protection Clause need not inter-

fere with existing accommodation.
A recent Harvard Law Review article surveying religious practice in
prison outlines different modes of religious accommodations." 9 Under the
neutral-accommodating approach, the food service operates multiple food
lines or salad bar containing food items such as beans and peanut butter
that satisfy many inmates across the religious spectrum at a low cost.'30 In
the past, most dietary accommodations followed a targeted-accommodating
approach, granting accommodation on a case-by-case, religion-by-religion
basis. A neutral-accommodating paradigm meets the requirements of the
Equal Protection Clause. 3 ' With the proliferation of minority religions
and ever changing composition of the prison population, the targetedaccommodating approach risks violating the Equal Protection Clause. Because
the neutral-accommodation approach opens the food options to all inmates,
not just to followers of a particular faith, it fully satisfies the Equal Protection
Clause. In terms of cost, the targeted-accommodating approach is cheap
when the population of religious inmates remains small and homogenous.
However the neutral-accommodating approach becomes more cost effective
in the long run as population and religious diversity increase. The Equal
Protection Clause will not eliminate access to religious accommodation. To
the contrary, equal protection litigation can signal the presence of a diverse
prison population that is ready for the switch from a targeted-accommodating
approach to a neutral-accommodating approach.
4.

Summary

When inmates allege a religious diet program that discriminates on the
basis of religion, courts should commence an equal protection analysis to
ascertain if the different treatments serve a legitimate penological interest.
Even when the inequality does not rise to the level of an equal protection
violation, the suggestion of unequal treatment between facilities or faith groups
has a role in the free exercise Turner/O'Lone test. Courts can use evidence of
See The Law of Prisons, supra note 9, at 1906-09; see also BECKFORD & GILLIAT, supra
129.
note 7, at 188.
Ironically, Texas, the state that opted for the zero-accommodation policy in Kahey, has
130.
now adopted the neutral-accommodating approach. See The Law of Prisons, supra note 9, at 1907
n.81. Perhaps an administration concerned with the ripple effect (where special accommodation
for one group encourages other groups to seek special treatments) and the Equal Protection Clause
is the one most capable of devising the neutral-accommodating approach.
See id. at 1906-08.
131.
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inequality as a litmus test for assessing the validity of an administration's
asserted penological interests, the potential impact of accommodation, or
the availability of an alternative food plan. Ultimately, by requiring a court
to consider the evidence of discriminatory treatment, the Equal Protection
Clause implicitly demands a more attentive judicial review based on the facts
of the particular accommodation.
C.

The Establishment Clause Perspective

The Establishment Clause prohibits state actors from making laws
"respecting an establishment of religion."'32 Even when the government
must
provide religious accommodation to fulfill its free exercise duties, it must
take care not to effect the establishment of religion in the process. '
Therefore, prison administrators and courts should heed the Establishment
Clause when confronting the religious dietary accommodation issues.
The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from promoting or
inhibiting one religion over another.' This prohibition against state-sponsored
preferential treatment adds force to the prohibition against discriminatory dietary accommodation.' Beyond mandating religious neutrality, the
Establishment Clause also forbids the government from participating in
religious activities even when the participation is nondiscriminatory. Thus,
to survive an Establishment Clause challenge, a law must reflect a clearly
secular purpose, have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and avoid excessive government entanglement with religion (the Lemon
test).'36
132.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
133.
Although government-sponsored religious accommodation may violate the Establishment
Clause, it was said that in prison, "a niche has necessarily been carved into the establishment
clause to require the government to afford opportunities for worship" to satisfy "the affirmative
demands of the free exercise clause." United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687, 698 (E.D.N.Y.
1975), modified, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cit. 1975).
134.
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally
ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT

FICTION (1982). I use the expression "at the minimum" because this is the only type of behavior
all nine Supreme Court Justices condemn under the Establishment Clause.
135.
See supra Part II.B.
136.
This three-part test was first announced in Lemon v.Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
(1971), and is commonly referred to as the Lemon test. Recently several Justices on the Supreme
Court have applied alternative tests to analyze Establishment Clause problems, most notably the
noncoercion test attributed to Justice Kennedy, see County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
659 (1989) (Kennedy J., dissenting) (arguing that noncoercive government accommodation or
acknowledgement of religion does not violate the Establishment Clause); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 592 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986), and the endorsement test attributed to Justices O'Connor and
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Unlike the rights discussed in the previous sections, the Supreme Court
has said nothing regarding the application of the Establishment Clause in
prison. Moreover, the majority of Establishment Clause cases have revolved
around issues far removed from prison religious diets. "7 Consequently, the
analysis of prison dietary issues under the Establishment Clause will trace
lower court decisions.
1.

Kosher Food Fraud Laws

Since 1920, numerous states have passed kosher fraud statutes, making
fraud
to sell nonkosher food as kosher with an intention to defraud conit a
38
sumers.1 In addition, these statutes often contain an enforcement mechanism
by which state officials may inspect the kosher products and bring noncompliant vendors to court. These statutes have recently come under attack.'39
For example, in Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, the Second
Circuit applied the Lemon test to invalidate New York State's kosher fraud
law. The court acknowledged: "[A] state has 'a valid interest in preventing fraud

Blackmun, see County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 600 (arguing that the Establishment Clause forbids
the government from endorsing religion). Justice Stevens consistently espouses a "high and
impregnable wall" between church and state forbidding the government from "pass[ing] laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (cited inJaffree, 472 U.S. at 53 n.37); see also Comm. for Pub. Ed. & Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). And finally, Justices
Rehnquist and Scalia would limit the prohibition of the Establishment Clause to laws that
discriminate among the religions. See, e.g., Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 75 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-84 (1990). This Comment will use the Lemon test
because the Supreme Court has yet to overrule Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court still mentions the Lemon test on occasion, and, most importantly, the lower courts still apply the Lemon
test regularly in the absence of any coherent alternative from the Supreme Court. The doctrinal
analysis may change under the other tests. However, the larger point is that prison religious diet
issues implicate the Establishment Clause, whatever the underlying test is.
Most Establishment Clause challenges in the Supreme Court fall into four areas: reli137.
gious exercise in public schools, government financial aid to parochial schools, state-sponsored
quasi-religious rituals and display, and tax exemptions for religious organizations/factories.
See, e.g., N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 26-a, 201-a to -i (McKinney Supp. 2003).
138.
139.
See generally Stephen F. Rosenthal, Food for Thought: Kosher Fraud Laws and the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951 (1997). Rosenthal presented a comprehensive analysis of the intersection between kosher fraud laws and the Constitution and ultimately
concluded that courts underanalyzed the issue when striking down the statutes. Id. at 1013.
However, he conceded that government involvement in doctrinal differences would violate the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 890. To date, these provisions are now valid in the Second Circuit,
the Fourth Circuit, and the State of New Jersey. See Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v.
Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 419 (2d Cir. 2002); Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, 66
F.3d 1337 (4th Cir. 1995); Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353 (N.J. 1992).
See generally LEVENSON,supra note 4 (presenting a humorous history of kosher food laws).
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in the sale of any foods, including kosher foods.". 40 Therefore, the statute contained a secular purpose. However, kosher fraud laws excessively entangled
government and religion: "[B]ecause the challenged laws interpret 'kosher' as
synonymous with the views... of Orthodox Judaism, the State has effectively
aligned itself with one side of an internal debate within Judaism. This it may
not do."' 4 Further entanglement occurred when the statute "require[d] New
York to adopt an official State position on a point of religious doctrine."'42 In
order to adopt the official position, the state must impermissibly "weigh[ I the
significance and the meaning of disputed religious doctrine"'43 or "employ[]
religious organizations as an arm of the civil [government] to perform the
function of interpreting and applying state standards."'" These same observations also supported a finding that the fraud statutes had the primary effect
of advancing Orthodox Judaism, inhibiting other branches of Judaism by
depriving them the utility of the kosher label and discouraging butchers from
adopting non-Orthodox kosher standards, and creating a joint venture between
4
the state and religion that advanced one religion under the state's sponsorship.' 1
The Establishment Clause, applied through the kosher fraud statutes cases,
can guide government action in the area of religious diets. It prohibits states
from taking a part in food-related sectarian disputes and from conducting
excessive searches into doctrinal gray areas in which different adherents adopt
different rules. Moreover, it also frowns upon laws that protect the food of
one sect without benefiting, and even harming, the interests of other sects.
These forbidden behaviors frequently arise in the prison religious diet cases.
2.

The Religious Requirement Test

Loyd LaFevers, a Seventh Day Adventist, requested a vegetarian diet
while incarcerated in the Oklahoma State Penitentiary.1 46 The request was
140. Commack, 294 F.3d at 431 (quoting Ran-Day's, 608 A.2d at 1366).
141.
Id. at 426.
142.
Id.
143.
Id. at 427.
144.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451-52 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
145.
Id. at 430-31. It is significant that these statutes will probably fail the endorsement
test because they endorse Orthodox Judaism, the neutrality test because they favor one branch of
Judaism (or favor Judaism over Islam for the lack of a halal fraud law), and the noncoercion test
because they force the butchers to adopt one kosher standard.
146.
LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117, 1118 (10th Cir. 1991). Incidentally, the plaintiffs
claims parallel the arguments of this Comment:
Plaintiff's complaint stated that the prison policy denies him his right to the free exercise
of religion under the First Amendment because it impermissibly infringes on his religious
beliefs and practices as a Seventh Day Adventist. He also contends that denying him a
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rejected, and he file suit alleging the rejection deprived him the free exercise
of his religion and the equal protection of the law.'47 The prison administration argued that a vegetarian diet was nutritionally deficient and that the
decision to deny the diet was related to the legitimate interest of avoiding
medical liability. The district court agreed and decided, in addition, that the
equal protection and free exercise arguments lacked merit because a vegetarian
diet was recommended but not required by the Seventh Day Adventist Church.
Because the diet was not a religious mandate, denial of the diet did not raise
constitutional issues.'48
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the lower court's reliance
on the distinction between what is religiously required and what is merely a
recommendation. Instead, the appellate court was willing to commence the
free exercise Turner/O'Lone analysis as long as the inmate could show that
he was a sincere believer and that the requested diet was religious. LaFevers
demonstrated that many Seventh Day Adventists are vegetarians because
the Church encourages vegetarianism. Based on this information, the court
decided that the plaintiff's vegetarianism was sufficiently religious to warrant protection under the Free Exercise Clause.'49
Although LaFevers did not mention the Establishment Clause, it raised
issues analogous to kosher food fraud statutes. The appellate court rejected
the district court's "requirement test" and limited the threshold inquiry to religiosity and sincerity. The determination of what is required or not required
would entangle courts and prison administrators in a debate of religious
orthodoxy and doctrinal hermeneutics, not unlike the situation of New York
State under the kosher fraud law.' Although couched in a discussion of the
Free Exercise Clause, the appellate court's admonition implied an entanglement concern: "'[lit is no business of courts to say that what is a religious

vegetarian diet constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Plaintiff's final argument is that appellees' policy denies him equal protection of the laws
because the Oklahoma Department of Corrections permits special religious diets for
members of other religions.

Id.
Id. Special meals were provided to followers of other religions. Id.
147.
148.
Id. In contrast, the "policy of offering a non pork diet for Muslim inmates was based on
the fact that such a diet is a necessary and fundamental part of the Muslim faith." Id.
Id. at 1119. Similarly, the requirement test was an insufficient basis for treating a Seventh
149.
Day Adventist differently than a Muslim inmate. Id.
Nevertheless, unlike Judaism, in which dietary differences constitute a point of conten150.
tion among splinter groups, the Seventh Day Adventists do not appear to treat vegetarianism as
an issue that divides the religion. Nonetheless, the fact that some adherents follow a vegetarian
diet while others do not suggests that individual Adventists attribute different importance to the
religious diet.
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practice or activity for one group is not religion under the protection of the
First Amendment."" 5 ' Even when a religion has reached a consensus on the
nature and importance of a dietary scheme, the requirement test would
favor those religions driven by a set of mandates over those religions without
any explicit requirements.' Out of respect for the antidiscrimination aspect
of the Establishment Clause, courts and administrations would do well to stay
away from arbitrating the centrality of a dietary plan in order to avoid the
impermissible business of espousing one sect over another and further entangling itself in sectarian conflicts.
Courts need a method to assess whether a set of facts triggers the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, and the Establishment Clause constrains
the type assessment a court may choose. Courts should not inquire if a practice
is required, but instead should limit the inquiry to whether the request
is religious and whether the inmate is sincere.'
Once an inmate satisfies
these two criteria, the judge should commence the Turner/O'Lonetest. The
next subpart explains how courts should conduct the free exercise Turner/
O'Lone analysis to resolve prison religious diet issues without offending the
Establishment Clause.

151.
Id.at 1119 (quoting Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953)) (alteration in original).
Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 n.l (1981). Widmar suggested that the University of
Missouri should not close its facilities to religious student groups because doing so
would risk greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious
worship" and "religious speech." Initially, the University would need to determine
which words and activities fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This
alone could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs meet the
constitutional definition of religion."
Id. (citation omitted).
152.
Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The D.C. Circuit observed
that such a test would leave religions "that lack the concepts of commandments necessary for the
salvation of the soul... outside the scope of First Amendment protection altogether." Id. Although
it reasoned that "[niothing in the free exercise clause suggests that it only protects religions that
incorporate mandatory tenets," a more robust analysis would be to recognize that the Establishment
Clause would forbid the lopsided protection. Id.
153.
See, e.g., Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[Iln determining
whether beliefs are to be accorded first amendment protection ... [the judicial] competence properly extends to determining 'whether the beliefs professed by a [claimant] are sincerely held and
whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious."' (citing United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163, 185 (1965))). These two questions are by no means easy to answer, and how courts
answer these two questions also raises Establishment Clause issues. An Establishment Clause analysis of
these two interesting but vast issues is beyond the scope of this Comment. Fortunately, there are
numerous works of scholarship on these two topics. Two of the current leading cases in this area
actually are prison accommodation cases, Africa v. Pennsylvania,662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981),
and Patrick, 745 F.2d 153. For a list of academic discussions of these topics, see Val D. Ricks, To God
God's, to Ceasar Ceasar's, and to Both the Defining of Religion, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1053, 1053
n.1 (1993).
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The Establishment Clause as a Turner/O'LoneConsideration

Because all determinations regarding religious diet in prison, including
the Turner/O'Lone test, produce religious effects and require state intervention in religious affairs, the application of the Turner test must be guarded
against Establishment Clause violations. The "alternative means" factor under
the TurnerlO'Lone test is especially susceptible to Establishment Clause
violation. The "alternative means" factor of the Turner/O'Lone test asks
courts to consider whether alternative means of exercising religion remain
open to prisoners under the regulation and gives administrators leeway to
burden some religious exercise if other venues of religious exercise remain
open. This factor requires courts to probe the relationship between specific
religious exercises and religion, and some judges and administrators have used
this factor to determine the necessity of a particular diet or assess the theological equivalency between two dietary schemes. Both practices violate the
Establishment Clause.
a.

The Religious Requirement Test Revisited

The Ninth Circuit granted special treatment to mandatory religious
diets under the "alternative means" factor in Ward v. Walsh." In Ward, a
Nevada prison denied the kosher diet request of an Orthodox Jewish inmate.
The Ninth Circuit found that the lower court applied the incorrect legal
standard and remanded the case for a Turner analysis. The Ninth Circuit
opined:
[Rielevant to the evaluation of the second factor is a distinction O'Lone
had no occasion to make: the distinction between a religious practice
which is a positive expression of belief and a religious commandment
which the believer may not violate at peril of his soul .... In order to
determine what alternatives are open to Ward, findings must be
made as to what is or is not forbidden by his religion. The district
court made no such findings; we must remand so that the court can do
155

SO.

Courts are split into two camps on the recommended/required distinction. The Tenth Circuit in Beerheide v. Suther 56 joined the Ninth Circuit
in holding that courts should distinguish between required and recom-

154.
155.
156.

1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 878.
286 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2002).
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mended religious diets.'57 In contrast, the Third Circuit in DeHart withdrew
the special protection it had previously afforded to mandatory diets 58' and
explicitly overruled precedent that had recognized the distinction. 9 Perhaps the Ninth Circuit correctly noticed a lacuna in the Turner/O'Lone test.'60
However, the Ward solution would still fail as an Establishment Clause
violation for the same reasons as the requirement test. 6 ' In DeHart,the administration denied vegetarian meals to a Buddhist inmate in part because vegetarianism was an expression of faith and not a mandate. The DeHart court
rejected the Ward approach because '[i]t is not within the judicial ken to
question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith.""62 The
Free Exercise Clause does allow the prison to decide whether the vegetarian
diet is religious and whether the prisoner is sincere in his religious beliefs.
However, once the vegetarian meal is deemed religious, reliance on
doctrinal distinction within a Turner factor would entangle the state action
with theology. Although the Establishment Clause was not explicitly mentioned in the analysis, the DeHart court's refusal to entangle itself with
doctrinal determinations or religious favoritism was identical to the concerns
voiced in the kosher fraud law cases. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit would
157.
Beerheide, 286 F.3d at 1192.
158.
DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 55 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).
159. Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 1998).
160.
The Supreme Court in O'Lone made clear that the proper inquiry is whether inmates
have alternative means of exercising their religion, not whether inmates have alternative means
of exercising a particular religious practice. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352
(1987) ("In Turner, we did not look to see whether prisoners had other means of communicating
with fellow inmates, but instead examined whether the inmates were deprived of 'all means of
expression."' (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 92)); see also Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,
417-18 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The Thornburgh Court notes:
The Court in Turner did not require that prisoners be afforded other means of communicating with inmates at other institutions ....
It held in Turner that it was sufficient if
other means of expression (not necessarily other means of communicating with inmates
in other prisons) remained available, and in O'Lone if prisoners were permitted to participate in other Muslim religious ceremonies.
Id. Although the Ninth Circuit claimed that the O'Lone analysis made no pronouncement on
this issue, Jumu'ah is, nonetheless, a "religious commandment." O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 345
("Jumu'ah is commanded by the Koran and must be held every Friday after the sun reaches its
zenith and before the Asr, or afternoon prayer.").
161.
The requirement test denies the TurnerlO'Lone analysis to nonmandatory practices.
The Ward "alternative means" analysis gives heightened protection to mandatory practices. For a
discussion discrediting the requirement test, see Part I1.C.2.
162.
DeHart, 227 F.3d at 56 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87
(1990)); see also DeHart, 227 F.3d at 56 ("Judges are not oracles of theological verity, and the
Founders did not intend for them to be declarants of religious orthodoxy." (citing African v.
Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cit. 1981)). For a brief review of vegetarianism in Buddhist
practice, see BUDDHISM AND VEGETARIANISM, supra note 2, at http://www.urbandharma.org/
udharma3/vegi.html.
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require courts to conduct a theological survey and make religious pronouncements that excessively entangle the court with religion. Perhaps the Ninth
and Tenth Circuits were sympathetic to prisoners' dietary claims and wanted
to extend additional protection to those practices that are not fungible;
unfortunately they employed constitutionally impermissible means. Therefore, the circuit split should be resolved against providing special analysis for
required religious practices.
b.

Judicial and Administrative Foray Into Comparative Religious Study

Another type of Establishment Clause violation arises from the question of religious equivalents. This type of error appears in the Tenth Circuit
case Beerheide v. Suthers, decided in 2002. In Beerheide, Orthodox Jewish
inmates claimed that their First Amendment right to free exercise of their
religion was violated when the Colorado prison system refused to supply
them kosher meals. Kosher food, for these inmates, includes all non-animal
products, meats from animals without cloven hooves (beef and lamb) or
from poultry, slaughtered and prepared in a set manner, and fishes with fins
and scales. In addition to specific items, the kosher law also prohibits foods
from coming in contact with nonkosher containers, utensils, or nonkosher
foods.'"

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Turner/O'Lone test
and found that the prison violated the inmates' right to the free exercise of
their religion. While discussing the "alternative means" factor, the administrators argued that alternative means exist for these inmates to exercise
their religious rights under this factor. They contended that "inmates could
obtain an 'alternative religious diet' .. . through the prison's 'common fare'

program.... Meals in this program are prepared with no pork or pork byproducts, or are vegetarian."'65 The administration acknowledged that this diet
did not meet the "strictest orthodox standards," but that it met "the basic
163.
Even as a tool to protect prisoners' rights, the mandate/expression dichotomy is a
double-edged sword. It enhances the protection afforded to religious mandates. However, this
distinction has the potential of eliminating protection for the "lesser" exercises. In DeHart, the
lower court found that a vegetarian meal is an expression, and therefore there are many
alternative means of practicing Buddhism besides a vegetarian meal. DeHart, 227 F.3d at 55. In
Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1999), a finding that vegetarianism is only an expression
of Buddhism barred an inmate's free exercise claim all together. A better way to afford religious diet
more protection would be to declare it a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clausein which case the Turner question under the second factor becomes whether inmates have alternative means of practicing the right to a religious diet.
164.
Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2002).
165.
Id. at 1186-87.
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tenants [sic] of a kosher diet."'66 The court disagreed with the administration's
characterization, declaring that a person either keeps kosher or not under
the Orthodox kosher law, and that the options within the common program
failed to provide an Orthodox kosher meal.'67
What is remarkable about this exchange is that the court and the
administration were trying to pin down what type of diet could satisfy the
kosher requirement, and, in the process, both the court and the administration
veered dangerously close to pronouncing what each saw as sufficient accommodation of religious diet.'68 To say that one religious diet is an alternative
to another religious diet is treading on dangerous ground not unlike the government's activity in equating various understandings of the kosher standard to that maintained by Orthodox Jews. The administration, and even the
courts, breached the establishment prohibition of state entanglement with
religion by arguing that the common fare was kosher enough for Orthodox
inmates.'69
The better approach, from the Establishment Clause point of view, is
to avoid elevating mandatory diets above religious exercise or substituting
one diet for another under the "alternative means" factor.'7 ° Courts and administrators should analyze the "alternative means" test by counting the alternative
venues that remain for inmates to exercise their particular religion, as was
implied in Turner and O'Lone.
4.

Answers to Potential Counterarguments

A believer in judicial economy may wonder if an Establishment Clause
claim accomplishes anything that is not already covered by the Free Exercise
or the Equal Protection Clauses. After all, the focus of the litigation is a matter
of one's personal right to practice religion and one's freedom from disparate
166.
Id. at 1187.
167.
Id.
168.
See Joseph C. Hutchison, Analyzing the Religious Free Exercise Rights of Inmates: The
Significance of Pell, Jones, and Wolfish, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 413, 435 (1983) (arguing
that courts are not competent to determine adequate alternatives to religious exercise).
169.
See, e.g., Spies, 173 F.3d at 407 (declaring that vegetarianism is an alternative means of
practicing veganism within Buddhism).
170.
This is not to say that the characteristics of the existing dietary program are irrelevant.
If the diet meets Jewish inmates' need, then their request for an alternative diet is not based on
religious need. It will fail the religiosity test and fail to trigger the protection of the Free Exercise
Clause. See Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276, 283 (3d Cit. 1998) (holding that the Free Exercise
Clause does not require prisons to provide hot kosher food, when cold kosher meals are available).
On the other hand, if it does not satisfy the kosher standard, then inmates have a legitimate
claim. What is not legitimate is for the administrators to take a meal known to be nonkosher and
characterize it as an alternative to a kosher diet within the Turner/O'Lone test.
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treatment. The claimant's liberty concerns under a classical Establishment
Clause claim are identical to the concerns under the Free Exercise or Equal
Protection Clauses.
The theoretical response is that the Establishment Clause analysis concerns state actors, not the litigant's liberty interest. Dietary accommodation
cases affect the delicate relationship between the church and the state.
Neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause adequately
answers the various forms of this institutional question. First, the establishment concern by its nature posits institutional questions unrelated to penal
incarceration. Surely the administration cannot convert a prison into a
sectarian church, even if doing so may serve the valid penological interest
of rehabilitation.17 1 Second, because the Establishment Clause operates apart
from inmates' individual situations, legal formulations of the church-state
relationship easily escape the prison confine and spill over into free society.
Prison Establishment Clause cases have been cited to support decisions in
the free world. 7 1 If the Establishment Clause were not guarded in prison, then
such a spillover application would inject a weaker Establishment Clause into
the traditional Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Third, the religious
dietary accommodation issue is rife with Establishment Clause issues: prison
administration may impermissibly base the nature of accommodation on
personal views regarding specific religions; food service regulations may
impermissibility distinguish prisoners based on their religious affiliations; a
prison may invoke impermissible religious distinctions to justify its food policy;
and courts may offend the Establishment Clause during the Turner/O'Lone
analysis. The opportunity for constitutional violation, together with the institutional focus and the spillover effect, demands a meaningful Establishment
Clause analysis.
The elimination of the requirement test may be perceived as a detriment. To those who are weary of prison litigation criteria of this type can
eliminate false or frivolous claims from the start, so courts need not waste
See Warburton v. Underwood, 2 F. Supp. 2d 306, 318 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (invalidating a
171.
prison-sponsored Alcoholics Anonymous program because government sponsorship of quasi-religious
rehabilitation violates the Establishment Clause).
Establishment Clause challenges to the constitutionality of state-sponsored Alcoholics
172.
Anonymous programs do not distinguish between prison and nonprison cases. See, e.g., DeStefano
v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397 (2d Cir. 2001). DeStefano questioned the constitutionality of state programs funding private Alcoholics Anonymous programs on Establishment
Clause grounds. It cited Warburton, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 306, without making any special reference or
qualification based on the prison context. DeStefano, 247 F.3d at 407. For an account of the
Alcoholics Anonymous program and the Establishment Clause, see generally Rachel F. Calabro,
Comment, CorrectionThrough Coercion: Do State Mandated Alcoholic and Drug Treatment Programs
in Prisons Violate the Establishment Clause?, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 565 (1998).
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valuable judicial resources conducting the fact-intensive Turner/O'Lone
test. Denying accommodation to nonessential dietary prescriptions also
appeals to the intuition that accommodation should only be supplied to those
who need it. To prisoners weary of administrative insensitivity, this distinction has been a boon in a hostile environment, promising protection of
essential religious rights as was done in Ward and Beerheide.73'
The benefit of the requirement test is probably overrated. Even if it can
secure some procedural efficiency or substantive rights at the margin, it leaves
a trail of conflicting precedents and a tattered church-state relationship
without producing a logically consistent resolution of religious diet issues in
prisons. As we have already seen, this distinction can work to the benefit
of the prisoner or of the prison administration, depending on the court that
wields it. The practical effect of removing this distinction is that prison cases
will increase slightly-"slightly" because inmates already have to cope with
the threshold question of religiosity and sincerity, and because religious
accommodation claims only constitute a small fraction of all prison litigation.174 This slight increase will be offset by the change in Turner because
courts are prohibited from carving out a special "mandatory" diet analysis
under the "alternative means" test. Overall, the elimination of the requirement test will not change the frequency of prison diet litigation, but it will
improve the logic and constitutionality of the free exercise analysis.
The need to control possible abuse remains. For example, an inmate
could attribute a request of steak and ice cream to a fictitious form of pagan
bull worship. On a less dramatic note, nonreligious inmates may wish to
adopt a religion in order to receive a diet of their choice: ethical vegetarians
may pretend to be Buddhists, and those who perceive kosher food as better
than the regular fare may assert a counterfeit belief in Judaism. Worse yet,
religious inmates may demand extravagant dietary accommodation.
While the concern of abuse is well founded, the administration still
retains the necessary tools to control unreasonable requests. Both the sincerity test and the religiosity test should counter inmates' demand for exotic
foods. The sincerity test should block nonreligious inmates' access to religious diet. When religious inmates demand special accommodations, the
request itself must pass muster under the religiosity test.17 Finally, all sincere
173.
See supra notes 154-157.
174.
See 139 CONG. REc. S14,462 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Lieberman)
(disputing arguments that the effect of legislation expanding inmates' rights will burden judicial
resources by noting that free exercise cases only account for 2 percent of all prisoner litigation).
175.
Courts can test the sincerity of inmates' convictions and credibility to eliminate opportunists during this stage.
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dietary requests must still proceed under the Turner/O'Lone test, which gives
the administration an opportunity to eliminate requests that are impracticable. Apart from the legal tools, prison administrators also retain full control
of actual food. They can ensure that the religious diet program appear as
(un)appetizing as the regular diets to remove incentives for nonreligious
inmates to feign religious interest.176
This discussion of implementation brings up the most fundamental
challenge to the Establishment Clause analysis. If the government cannot
use religious information to decide what the religion needs nor rely on
members of the religious community to prescribe a religious diet, how can it
decide what to provide in the actual accommodation?
The apparent impossibility is eased by the nature of dietary accommodation. Unlike the kosher food fraud law, religious dietary accommodation
does not require administrators to determine the religious status of every single
food item. Religious diets are usually characterized by abstinence-Hindus
cannot eat beef, Muslims and Jews cannot eat pork, and Rastafarians cannot
eat meat. As long as the food service provides "consensus items" that meet
the requirement of all religions or sects, it will not advance, inhibit, or
endorse any particular religion. As long as the administrators operate within
a list of common denominators under the previously mentioned neutralaccommodating approach, they can steer clear of doctrinal debates and avoid
excessive entanglement with religion.'77 The self-help idea implemented
through a salad bar further enables inmates to maintain their own diets." 8
5.

Summary

A robust Establishment Clause analysis can lead to a more simplified
and uniform application of the Turner/O'Lone test to prison religious diet
issues. Prison administrators and courts should avoid theological debates
regarding whether a particular diet is required or optional. As long as the
request is religious, and the inmate is sincere in his or her beliefs, courts should
commence the free exercise Turner/O'Lone test. Administrative decisions
See The Law of Prisons, supra note 9, at 1908 n.90. One prison official notes:
176.
The monotony of the same three TV dinner-like options serves as an easy proxy for sincerity, without much added cost and without the need for the state to disqualify any
inmate from choosing a religious diet. The same is true for vegetarian diets: "[l]nmates
have visions of a variety of fresh fruits and what you get are veggie patties. You have to
be a committed vegetarian to stick with it."
Id. (citations omitted).

177.

See supra notes 130-131 and accompanying text.

178.

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 51 UCLA L. Rev. 1193 2003-2004

1194

51 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1151 (2004)

and judicial reasoning under the "alternative means" factor of the free
exercise Turner/O'Lone test should also avoid the questions of whether a
particular diet is required and whether two dietary schemes are religious
alternatives to each other. Ultimately, prison administrators and courts
should rest their analysis on legitimate penological purposes, not impermissible religious determinations, in order to satisfy the requirements of the
Establishment Clause.
1II. THE CROSSCUTTING OBJECTION: ARE THE TURNER/O'LONE
TEST AND THE MULTIRIGHTS ANALYSIS RELEVANT TODAY?
The Turner and O'Lone opinions are each seventeen years old. During
this period, constitutional law governing religious exercise witnessed dramatic change outside the prison walls. In light of subsequent case law and
legislation that seems to supersede Turner, one must wonder whether the
Turner/O'Lone free exercise analysis and the multirights approach outlined in
this Comment retain any relevance in inmates' dietary accommodation cases.
Before addressing this general concern, it is necessary to briefly review the
changes in free exercise law.'79
A. The Right to Religious Exercise Outside the Prison
Walls: A Brief History
Prior to 1990, the protection of the Free Exercise Clause exempted
individuals from laws burdening their sincerely held belief and its exercise
unless such laws furthered compelling governmental ends by means that
were the least restrictive to religious exercise (the "strict scrutiny" test)."
But in Employment Division v. Smith, 5 1 the Supreme Court ruled that a
facially neutral state drug law burdening a Native American's use of peyote
during ceremonies is facially valid as long as it was generally applicable and
rationally related to legitimate state interests (the "rational basis" test). Only
those laws targeting religious exercise specifically or burdening a "hybrid" of
free exercise rights and other constitutional liberties deserve the protection
179.
For a more complete history of prisoner's rights until 1998, see Susan N. Herman, Slashing
and Burning Prisoners' Rights: Congress and the Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229
(1998), and The Law of Prisons, supra note 9.
180. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The history of the Free Exercise Clause
litigation reveals that even before 1990, the Court had not consistently applied the compelling
interest standard. See Greenawalt, supra note 107, at 329-33.
181.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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of the "strict scrutiny test."' 2 Amid outcries from religious organizations,
Congress struck back in 1993 with RFRA, which required courts to scrutinize laws burdening religious exercise using the pre-Smith strict scrutiny
standard."s3 Four years later the Supreme Court declared RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the state governments and state agencies in City of Boerne
v. Flores." Congress tried to legislate religious protection again and unanimously passed RLUIPA 5 RLUIPA limits its scope to residents of institutions receiving Federal funding and imposes the pre-Smith standard on laws
burdening the religious exercise of such individuals."

Id. at 881-82, 881 n.1.
182.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2000)
183.
(held unconstitutional as against the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
The act provides:
(a) In general Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
Id. § 2000bb-1.
184.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc185.
2000cc-5 (2003). The statute provides:
Protection of religious exercise of institutionalized persons
(a) General rule
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person
residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
(b) Scope of application
This section applies in any case in which(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal
financial assistance; or
(2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would
affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian
tribes.
Id. § 2000cc-1.
Muslim inmates in California State Prison have already invoked RLUIPA to protect
186.
their free exercise rights, and so far, RLUIPA has withstood constitutional challenge. See
Mayweathers v. Terhune, No. S961582LKKGGHP, 2001 WL 804140, at *1, *8 (E.D. Cal. July 2,
2001).
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The Turner/O'Lone Test Versus Smith

The legal interaction of this tumultuous history and inmates' access to
religious diet is unclear at best. First, the Turner/O'Lone test and the Smith
decision seem to be in conflict." 7 The most self-conscious discussion of the
conflict between Turner/O'Lone and Smith appeared in Levitan v. Ashcroft,'" a
2002 case involving Catholic inmates' protest against a new prison regulation
barring the use of wine during Mass. There the D.C. Circuit observed:
Many courts have grappled with the question of how the Court's
decision in Smith interacts with the prisoner-specific test set forth
in Turner and O'Lone. One possibility is that Smith supplanted the
Turner analysis, because Smith can be read to say that religious inmates
should never be entitled to exemptions from generally applicable,

religion-neutral prison regulations. Another possibility is that Smith
simply has no application in the unique and highly regulated prison
context, so Turner and O'Lone continue to govern. A third possibility
is that ... Smith is relevant in determining the scope of a person's free
exercise right. .. while Turner and O'Lone are employed in determining how that right may be circumscribed in the specialized prison
context.... Most Courts of Appeals have taken the second approach,
simply continuing to apply Turner and O'Lone in analyzing prisoners'
9
constitutional rights.1

Courts avoid the effects of Smith in one of two ways: Some courts hold
that Smith does not apply to prison because it was not a prison case,' 9° while
other courts avoid the issue because the government defendants and administrators do not raise Smith as an alternative to Turner.9' It is clear that after
187.
See Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 48 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Smith cut back, possibly to
minute dimensions, the doctrine that requires government to accommodate, at some cost, minority religious preferences: the doctrine on which all the prison religion cases are founded."); Harris
v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 918 (11 th Cit. 1995) (suggesting in dicta that the residual right to a religious diet might not have survived the Supreme Court's Smith decision).
188.
281 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
189.
Id. at 1318-19.
190.
Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 481-87 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Turner to a prison
grooming regulation and declining to apply Smith); Green v. Polunsky, 229 F.3d 486, 489-91 (5th
Cir. 2000) (applying Turner and O'Lone to a prisoner's free exercise claim); DeHart v. Horn, 227
F.3d 47, 51-60 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (applying the Turner factors to a prisoner's religious right
to have a special diet in prison); Sasnett v. Litscher, 197 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 1999); Ward v.
Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 876-77 (9th Cit. 1993) (distinguishing prison diet cases from Smith).
191.
See, e.g., Levitan, 281 F.3d at 1318; Hakim v. Hicks, 223 F.3d 1244, 1247-49, 1247 n.3
(11th Cit. 2000) (applying Turner and O'Lone because the government had not argued that Smith
required a different standard). It is a unclear why the government did not raise Smith in defense,
because the rational basis test is more favorable to defending administrators. Under Smith, the
administrators only need to show that the regulation is rational, rather than having to justify their
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fourteen years Smith has not gained a following in the context of prisoners'
free exercise rights, and the Turner/O'Lone test remains the status quo.' 92
But even if in the future Smith should scale the prison wall and supplant
the Turner/O'Lone test, the multirights analysis advanced in this Comment
would still play a special role under Smith. Smith reserves the protection of
the strict scrutiny test to "hybrid claims": those claims involving a government action that burdens multiple constitutional rights including the right
to the free exercise of religion. Through the lens of the multirights
approach, a prison religious dietary accommodation claim becomes the
paradigmatic hybrid claim involving First Amendment religious rights, the
Eighth Amendment condition-of-confinement analysis, and the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection guarantee.' 9 Thus the adaptation of Smith will
only increase the importance of the multirights approach, not diminish it.
C.

The TurnerlO'Lone Test Meets RFRA and RLUIPA

In contrast to Smith, RFRA and the new RLUIPA suggest that courts
must always use the strict scrutiny test when assessing the legitimacy of prison
regulations that burden inmates' religious exercise. Unlike Smith, these acts
were drafted with the intent of enabling religious exercise in prison, and courts
decision under the four Turner factors. Moreover, because the choice of standard is a question of
law, it is legitimate for courts to analyze the proper standard sua sponte. It is very puzzling for the
court to say that it took notice of the potential applicability of Smith, and then to proceed under
Turner.
The interaction between Smith and Turner/O'Lone probably deserves additional discus192.
sion. In Smith, Justice Scalia cited O'Lone to support the proposition that neutral laws have been
held to a reasonableness standard in the past. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884
(1990). Thus it is possible, in the eyes of the Supreme Court, that Smith and O'Lone are actually
two manifestations of the same test. See Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168, 1171 n.7 (8th Cir.
1990) (holding that Smith does not disturb the Turner/O'Lone analysis).
193.
Scholars and justices have criticized the "hybrid claims" as a make-weight argument to
explain away precedents and as bordering on the incomprehensible. See Greenawalt, supra note
107, at 335; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Souter notes:
If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then
the hybrid exception would.., swallow the Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception
would cover the situation exemplified by Smith, since free speech and associational rights
are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual. But if a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an exemption.., under another constitutional provision,
then there would have been no reason for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid cases
to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.
Id. Perhaps the prison is one place where the hybrid approach makes sense-in prison, nearly all
regulations burdening inmates' constitutional rights are evaluated under the reasonableness standard.
Smith could propel regulations that burden multiple constitutional rights into the strict scrutiny
test.
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are not free to ignore them. 94 However, Turner and O'Lone remained the
basic test to adjudicate inmates' religious dietary accommodation claims
prior to 1993, before RFRA was passed, and between 1997 and 2000, after
RFRA's application to the states was invalidated and before RLUIPA was
passed. The Turner/O'Lone test will remain the default test if the Supreme
Court should declare RLUIPA unconstitutional. This is not yet the time to
move our focus away from the Turner/O'Lone test.
Even in the presence of religious legislation it is important to understand how the constitutional Turner/O'Lone test operates. According to Ira
Lupu, there were 148 RFRA cases in the federal courts prior to RFRA's
invalidation, of which 94 involved prisons. 95 Inmates found relief in only nine
cases."' Meanwhile, courts continued to conduct the Turner/O'Lone test for
constitutional violation in addition to RFRA. RFRA had failed to deliver its
promise of protecting inmates' religious exercise rights. 97 Lupu attributes the
failure to judges' unwillingness to exempt individuals from generally applicable laws.'9 In addition, he hypothesizes:
[Jiudges ... may be skeptical about intensely held religious commitments[,] ... sensitive to the possibility of religious fraud.... perceive
a danger of Establishment Clause violations hanging over the project
of religious exemptions[,] . .. [and] sense the dangers of bias ... about
various religious traditions and movements .... Better no exemptions,
they might well say, than a pattern of exemptions riddled by religious
favoritism.9

In order to avoid the application of RFRA to prison cases, judges limited
the strict scrutiny test to only those practices required by the religion,"
"excluded cases of sectarian discrimination from RFRA" when accommodation was provided to one sect but not the other,' made judgments about the
194.
See Ira C. Lupu, The Failureof RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 583 (1998);
Daniel J. Solove, Note, Faith Profaned: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Religion in the

Prisons, 106 YALE L.J. 459, 471-72 (1996).
195.

Lupu, supra note 194, at 590.

196.

Id.

199.

Id. at 593.

200.
201.

Id. at 594.
Id. at 595-96.

197.
See generally Solove, supra note 194 (arguing that RFRA has failed to protect prisoners'
religious rights); Lupu, supra note 194, at 585 (dismissing the effect of RFRA on protecting religious rights, even in prison where "RFRA probably did not create any dramatic alteration in the
climate of relations between inmates and administrators on matters of religious liberty"); The Law
of Prisons, supra note 9, at 1894 ("Heightened scrutiny during the RFRA period did not produce
any particular inmate-friendly trend in the courts-judges continued generally to defer to the
asserted penological interests of correctional administrators.").
198. Lupu, supra note 194, at 591.
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nature of prisoners' religious experiences,"' "accepted without question the
2 3 and ignored other prisons' pertheological conceptions of prison officials,""
4
missive regulationsX
None of these evasive maneuvers is unique to RFRA-these same
approaches have plagued the Turner/O'Lone test. A court that refused to protect inmates' rights under Turner probably would use the same logic to avoid
the application of RFRA, and a court that embraced RFRA probably would
have extended Turner and O'Lone to enable prison religious exercise without
the help of RFRA. Given RFRA's lackluster performance, it is doubtful
whether RLUIPA can offer any protection beyond what courts are willing to
grant under the Turner/O'Lone test. Therefore, a study of the Turner/O'Lone
test is a study of the same fundamental mindset that underlies the failure of
RFRA and possibly RLUIPA.
D.

The Multirights Approach Versus the Free Exercise Analysis

This last rebuttal is also a summary of what the multirights analysis is
attempting to accomplish, in light of the shifting free exercise jurisprudence. The subject of this Comment is properly religious diet in prison, and
not free exercise rights. When prisoners complain, they complain about the
lack of religious food, but what courts need to hear is the lack of constitutional rights. Consequently, there is a step of translation from inmates'
physical deprivation into a legally cognizant claim. The multirights approach
is an exercise in translating one event-the lack of religious diet-into as
many constitutional dialects as possible, and this Comment urges courts to
hear the less common tongues of the Equal Protection Clause, the
Establishment Clause, and the Eighth Amendment. 5 Only when the translation is accomplished can courts apply the Smith test, the Turner/O'Lone
test, or RFRA/RLUIPA. Therefore, the changing religious freedom standards
in prisons do not undermine the idea that prison diet issues trigger multiple
constitutional provisions.
The interaction between the multirights analysis and the Free Exercise
Clause does affect the details of the TurnerlO'Lone factors: Judges should
evaluate evidence of discriminatory treatment between religions and between
202.
Solove, supra note 194, at 478.
203.
Id. at 484.
204.
Id. at 483.
205.
The linguistic metaphor is apt, as most of the cases discussed in this Comment involve
pro se litigation in which religious inmates drafted their complaints and pursued the litigation
without the help of an attorney.
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institutions, calculate the impact of accommodation in light of the potential
cost of medical service to starving inmates, and renounce legal analysis
based on whether a religion requires a diet or merely recommends it. These
details provide judges with constitutional reasons to choose one concrete
method of analyzing the Turner factors over another method. But far from
being bound to the Turner/O'Lone analysis, these specific recommendations
can transcend the four-factor test and address identical problems arising
under RFRA and RLUIPA. 0 6 Questions regarding the legitimacy of the requirement test and the evidentiary weight of discriminatory accommodation will
arise during inmates' religious diet claims, and no amount of tampering with
the free exercise standard of review can resolve these questions because the
Free Exercise Clause simply does not compel an answer. However, other
provisions of the Constitution can answer these questions, whether the
basic analysis traces Smith (the rational basis test), Turner/O'Lone (the fourfactors balancing test), or RLUIPA (the strict scrutiny test). Stated in the
broadest terms, the multirights approach requires judges to heed the
Constitution as a whole when conducting an analysis of one of its provisions.
Doing otherwise-that is, contradicting one portion of the Constitution
(equal protection) during the service of another (free exercise)-defeats the
very purpose of conducting a constitutional analysis. The changing standards
governing prison religious exercise in no way undermine the idea that judges
should respect the Constitution in its entirety when analyzing specific
constitutional claims.
CONCLUSION

The prison is a remote place. 7 Like an alien moon, it revolves near the
"real world," houses shadowy denizens, follows different rules, and never intersects our lives. It has been difficult, as a free humanist citizen with unlimited
access to food, to ponder prison religious diet issues. Even judges and Justices,
the very gatekeepers between the two worlds, share similar sentiments when
they warn: "[C]ourts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent
problems of prison administration and reform."2"
Justice Brennan, in the epigraph that began this Comment, told us
that the two worlds and two bodies of law are not so far apart. He urged the
Court to adopt a uniform standard for reviewing religious questions instead of
206.
See supra notes 199-204.
207.
See Herman, supra note 179, at 1299.
208.
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
405 (1974)).
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creating the reasonableness standard in prison and a standard of strict
scrutiny in free society. As if to mock his entreaty, the Supreme Court lowered the standard of review for free citizens' free exercise claims three years
later in Smith. The majority opinion observed that the Free Exercise Clause
has always been analyzed under the reasonableness standard and cited O'Lone
to support its view without addressing its unique prison context.
This Comment was written not with prisoners' rights in mind, but the
rights of free citizens. Prisoners' rights define the de facto constitutional minimum for the entire citizenry, and prison administration is an obscure arm of the
government. Interactions between the courts, the prison, and the prisoners
represent a quiet modification of the constitutional floor. Far from being
irrelevant, the prison is a laboratory of constitutional jurisprudence, where
basics rights are contested, deprived, or gained on a daily basis. These changes
do escape the prison confines, influencing constitutional jurisprudence and
the relationship between government and free citizens as it had occurred
between O'Lone and Smith. Despite Justice Brennan's lament, the change
in the standard of review between O'Lone and Smith is but one saga in the
diminution of civil rights, and this is the less important saga; as the observers
of RFRA noticed, the difference in protection between reasonableness and
strict scrutiny is often cosmetic. The prison religion dietary cases tells another
saga of how an action like consuming a religious diet-an action laden with
meaning and nuance-has been straitjacketed into the protection of a single
constitutional writ. Here the loss is total, amendment by amendment. The
goal of this Comment is to minimize the danger of "creeping constitutionality" and to reinvigorate legal protection by weaving a constitutional
skein. It is not yet complete, without considering the expressive aspects of
a religious diet and possible fundamental rights in a religious dietary choice.
But the point of the multirights methodology is made. If courts would
adjudicate the constitutional rights of free citizens based on precedents set in
prison, surely it is not too much for free citizens to ask for a more robust constitutional analysis in prison cases.

209.

Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883-84 (1990).
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